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FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
FOR SHARED PRIVACY RIGHTS IN STORED 
TRANSACTIONAL DATA 
 
Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke* 
INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world of pervasive, ubiquitous data collection and 
retention.1 Modern computer technology permits us to acquire and 
retain knowledge, communicate instantly and globally, purchase 
goods and services, engage in hobbies, and participate in politics 
and cultural affairs, all in less time and with less expense than once 
dreamed possible. One major effect of this revolution has been a 
serious reduction in an individual’s rights and expectations of 
                                                          
 * Susan W. Brenner is the NCR Distinguished Professor of Law and 
Technology at the University of Dayton School of Law. Leo L. Clarke is an 
Associate Professor at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School. 
1 The phrases “ubiquitous technology” and “ubiquitous computing” are 
used interchangeably to refer to technologies woven into the fabric of everyday 
life. See, e.g., Niall Winters, Personal Privacy and Popular Ubiquitous 
Technology, UBICONF (2004), http://www.uclic.ucl.ac.uk/projects/ubiconf/ 
materials/Papers/Niall%20Winters.pdf. “Ubiquitous computing involves having 
computing devices essentially everywhere in the home, office or public area, as 
well as easy, natural ways for people to interact with them. Wireless 
technologies, sensors, radio frequency identification (RFID) tags and machine-
to-machine communications will play a big role in this new area of computing.” 
John Blau, German Group Studies Ubiquitous Computing, Data Privacy, 
NETWORK WORLD, Dec. 22, 2004, http://www.nwfusion.com/news/ 
2004/1222germagroup.html. This article focuses on “communicative” 
technologies instead of, say, industrial or agricultural technologies. Its concern 
is with technologies that can be used to generate information, collect 
information and/or share information. See infra Part I. The Fourth Amendment 
is, of course, concerned with channeling how law enforcement finds (searches) 
and obtains (seizes) varieties of information. See infra Part II.A. 
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privacy. It has become increasingly common for data about our 
transactions and ourselves (Data) to be collected and retained by 
third parties (Collectors) who often disclose more intimate details 
of our lives and lifestyles than would have ever been imaginable or 
acceptable just a decade ago. In turn, this retention creates an 
unprecedented risk that a local, state or federal government 
(Government) can obtain, without the need for a warrant, Data 
about individuals (Consumers) to which it has never had access.2 
This risk arises because a Collector in possession of Data could 
decide to disclose that Data to law enforcement officials, and under 
certain United States Supreme Court decisions, the Consumer to 
whom the Data relates could be deemed to have assumed the risk 
of that disclosure.3 
                                                          
2 In 2004, the Pew Internet & American Life Project surveyed “1,286 
Internet stakeholders” to elicit their views as to how the Internet will change our 
lives between 2004 and 2014. ELON UNIVERSITY, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN 
LIFE PROJECT, THE EXPERTS SURVEY, IMAGINING THE INTERNET (2004), 
http://www.elon.edu/predictions/q12.aspx. One statement as to which the survey 
requested reactions was: 
As computing devices become embedded in everything from clothes to 
appliances to cars to phones, these networked devices will allow greater 
surveillance by governments and businesses. By 2014, there will be 
increasing numbers of arrests based on this kind of surveillance by 
democratic governments as well as by authoritarian regimes. 
Id. Among the responses was the following: “We must think through the way 
technology changes what is private, and develop new concepts of reasonable 
privacy that preserve liberty and are workable in a networked world.” Id. 
3 It appears that the United States Department of Justice may be 
considering “the explosive idea” of requiring, presumably through legislation, 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to retain records of all e-mail and web 
browsing activities by customers. Declan McCullagh, Your ISP as Net 
Watchdog, CNET NEWS, June 16, 2005, http://news.com.com/Your+ISP+ 
as+Net+watchdog/2100-1028_3-5748649.html. A requirement that records be 
retained can only indicate a strong Government interest in the types of requests 
under consideration in this article. At the present time, the Stored Wire and 
Electronic Communication Transaction Records Act requires ISPs to retain 
certain transactional records for 90 days only upon Government request and to 
produce those records under certain conditions which are consistent with Fourth 
Amendment protections. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2005). That statute is not germane to 
our discussion because nothing under that statute precludes an ISP from 
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Privacy evolved as a “bricks and mortar” concept.4 When the 
Fourth Amendment was added to the Constitution, the real-world 
was the only world; technology had not yet given us the ability to 
transcend the strictures of the real-world.5 We now have that 
ability: we can substitute the virtual realities provided by computer 
technology for the physical world; we can communicate 
instantaneously with almost anyone from almost anywhere and we 
use technologies to make our lives easier, to earn our living and 
even for our own amusement. 
Our use of this technology has resulted in the creation of new 
relationships whereby we now use third parties to process or store 
information that we previously maintained ourselves. We are also 
replacing inefficient real-world relationships that have become too 
expensive, too slow or too imprecise. While these changes may 
enhance convenience and cost-saving efficiency, they do so at the 
expense of privacy. For example, many Internet users now rely on 
third-party providers for the digital storage of private documents, 
correspondence (including e-mail), business and financial records, 
family photographs and hobby information. Do we lose our 
privacy interest in those materials when we entrust them to a third 
party? In the past, when information was disclosed to educational, 
religious and medical institutions it was done either orally or in 
scattered paper documents. Now, such information is stored in a 
digital format allowing that information to be collected, sorted and 
reported in ways never before possible. With the increasing 
computerization of home services, from home security services 
and cable television to “smart houses,”6 security information that 
                                                          
voluntarily disclosing information to Government without requiring 
Government to comply with the Act. 
4 The phrase “bricks-and-mortar” “[d]escribes a site that has a physical 
presence in the real world (as opposed to a virtual presence in the online 
world).” THE WORD SPY (2005), http://www.wordspy.com/words/bricks-and-
mortar.asp. 
5 NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 79–105 (1937). 
6 “Smart houses” (or “aware homes”) incorporate intelligent, embedded 
systems which interact with the occupants and with outside systems. See, e.g., 
GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, THE AWARE HOME, http://www.cc. 
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was previously available only to family members is now 
communicated to databases managed by third parties. The 
increasing sophistication of remote sensing and database 
technology means that the amount of information available to 
providers of utility and telecommunications services has 
dramatically increased. Do we lose our privacy interest in that 
information because it is now more efficient to collect it in a 
database where it can be searched and sorted in a myriad of ways? 
This discussion brings us to the question at hand: Can the 
Fourth Amendment’s privacy guarantee be adapted to deal with a 
world in which technology is increasingly pervasive—a world of 
ubiquitous technology?7 In this article, we consider whether Fourth 
Amendment protections should apply to Data provided by a 
Consumer to a Collector pursuant to a confidentiality agreement 
when the Data would not otherwise be available to Government 
without a warrant or proof that an exception to the warrant 
requirement applies. Our contention is that Fourth Amendment 
protection should not vanish simply because advances in 
technology permit, and to a certain extent make unavoidable, 
massive Data collection and mining that expose Consumers to the 
enhanced risks of a Collector’s breach of trust.8 Instead, we argue 
                                                          
gatech.edu/fce/ahri/ [hereinafter THE AWARE HOME]; PHILIPS RESEARCH, 
AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE: A NEW USER EXPERIENCE, http://www.research. 
philips.com/InformationCenter/Global/FArticleSummary.asp?lNodeId=712 
[hereinafter AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE]. See also Mark Ward, Smart Homes Offer 
A Helping Hand, BBC NEWS (May 19, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/technology/ 3715927.stm. An “aware home” will “be able to recognize the 
people that live in it, adapt . . . to them [and] learn from their behavior.” 
AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE, supra. Similar systems will become features of offices, 
hotel rooms and other environments. See, e.g., K. DUCATEL ET AL., EUROPEAN 
COMM’N, IST ADVISORY GROUP, SCENARIOS FOR AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE IN 
2010, 4-7, (February 2001), available at http://www. 
newscenter.philips.com/assets/Downloadablefile//ISTAG_scenarios-31461215. 
pdf [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SCENARIOS FOR AMBIENT 
INTELLIGENCE]. 
7 See, e.g., Winters, supra note 1; Blau, supra note 1. 
8 Data encryption technologies could be employed to eliminate the risk of 
Government access. However, reliance on encryption would not eliminate the 
need for Fourth Amendment protection for several reasons. First, Consumers are 
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that protection of such Data is mandated by the doctrine of Katz v. 
United States,9 which held that the Fourth Amendment protects 
information as to which the individual has exhibited a subjective 
expectation of privacy as long as the expectation is one that society 
recognizes as reasonable. In other words, we argue that the Fourth 
Amendment should not permit Government to reap a windfall from 
a Collector’s maintenance of confidential information relating to 
its transactions with Consumers. 
We begin, in Section I, by demonstrating the need for what we 
term “relation-based shared privacy.” We briefly explain how 
under the Constitution, the societal benefits of pervasive, 
ubiquitous technology can only be achieved if we recognize the 
privacy of certain stored transactional data. In the absence of a 
constitutional recognition of that privacy, the only alternatives are 
to forego utilization of the technology or to resort to inefficient 
barriers to exploitation of privacy. 
Section II(A) explains how relation-based shared privacy is 
consistent with a long history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
relating to, and dealing with, technological advances. Section II(B) 
then demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s post-Katz 
pronouncements about consent and assumption of risk are 
inconsistent with that history and the recognition of a privacy 
interest in transactional data. 
In Section III, we describe in more detail the contours of 
relation-based shared privacy. We define the nature of the required 
relationship between Consumer and Collector and the criteria Data 
must meet to receive Fourth Amendment protection. Essentially, 
the Consumer is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for Data 
                                                          
unlikely to undertake encryption of their own accord, if only because current 
encryption techniques are difficult to use, at least for those who do not have 
some technical expertise. Second, encryption would lead to its own 
inefficiencies because uniform standards of encryption do not yet exist. As a 
result, encryption would reduce the benefits of pervasive technology to the 
extent it would interfere with the ability to gather and mine data obtained at 
various times and from various sources for commercial and other purposes. 
Finally, there is no reason to believe that Government could not obtain from the 
Collector the necessary key(s) to the encrypted data. 
9 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For more on Katz, see infra Part II.A. 
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maintained by a Collector pursuant to a confidentiality agreement 
and with whom the Collector has a “trust-based” relationship (with 
“trust-based” defined broadly and not legally), as long as the Data 
is maintained at least in part for the Consumer’s benefit and is 
directly accessible by the Consumer. We conclude that, if those 
conditions are satisfied, Government should not be able to obtain 
the Data merely upon request to the Collector, absent proof that 
Government could otherwise have obtained the Data through use 
of its ordinary procedures in the course of a good faith 
investigation of a crime. 
I. THE NEED FOR PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF UBIQUITOUS 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to 
the next step which must be taken . . . for securing to the 
individual what Judge Cooley calls the right ‘to be let 
alone.’10 
                                                          
10 Samuel Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (1890), available at http://www.louisville.edu/library/law/ 
brandeis/privacy.html (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d 
ed. 1888)) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis]. The Fourth Amendment offered no 
protection from these activities because it only applies to state action. See, e.g., 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961). The “evils” Warren and Brandeis 
were addressing resulted from the efforts of private citizens, which is why they 
ultimately cast their right to privacy as a tort: those whose privacy was violated 
could bring an “action of tort for damages in all cases” and could seek an 
injunction in “a very limited class of cases.” Warren & Brandeis, supra at 219. 
This aspect of the Warren-Brandeis right is relevant to the present discussion 
because it represents an early attempt to deal with the impact technology has 
upon “informational privacy,” i.e., with an individual’s ability to exercise some 
control over how the private sector gathers, disseminates and uses personal 
information. See, e.g., Winters, supra note 1 (explaining informational privacy 
as the ability of “‘individuals, groups or institutions to determine when, how and 
to what extent information about them is communicated to others’”) (quoting 
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) [hereinafter WESTIN, PRIVACY 
AND FREEDOM]). See also Alan F. Westin, Social and Political Dimensions of 
Privacy, 59 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 431, 431 (2003) [hereinafter Westin, Social and 
Political Dimensions] (explaining privacy as “the claim of an individual to 
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In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their 
famous article, The Right to Privacy,11 which argued for a common 
law cause of action for invasion of an individual’s privacy. This 
differed from the contemporaneous Fourth Amendment concept of 
privacy because the common law cause of action (i) was directed 
at private parties and (ii) did not involve a zero-sum approach to 
privacy.12 The article is of interest here for two reasons. First, it 
was an early recognition of the changing notion of privacy in our 
society, especially in light of technological advances such as 
photography, newspaper publishing and the interception of 
telephone communications.13 Second, and more importantly, it 
represents an early attempt to deal with the impact technology has 
upon “informational privacy.”14 Warren and Brandeis 
                                                          
determine what information about himself or herself should be known to 
others . . . . This, also, involves . . . what uses will be made of it by others”). See 
generally Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1335, 1350 (1992). 
11 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 193. 
12 Id. As is explained later in the text, the Fourth Amendment has 
historically been interpreted as incorporating a zero-sum conception of privacy. 
In a zero-sum conception of privacy, only two states exist: private or not-private. 
13 See infra note 14. For an extensive analysis of the background and 
content of the Warren & Brandeis article, see Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth 
Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, __ MISS. L. J. __ (2005) 
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Brenner]. 
14 Warren and Brandeis were reacting to late nineteenth-century 
technology: improved printing and photograph reproduction, hand-held cameras, 
bugs and other eavesdropping devices. These and other technologies 
transformed personal information into a commodity; the press in prior eras had 
published information about “notables,” but the subjects were usually able to 
control the information that went to the press. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHUDSON, 
DISCOVERING THE NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 12-57 
(1978). See generally FREDERICK HUDSON, JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
FROM 1690-1872 (1873). The proliferation of informational technologies and 
attendant demand for information that arose at the end of the nineteenth century 
changed all this; the socially- and politically-prominent were obvious targets. 
See, e.g., id. at 1352 n.84 (illustrating how the press hounded President Grover 
Cleveland on his honeymoon). However, just as today, the technology soon 
affected all segments of the population. See ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN 
FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH ROCK TO 
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demonstrated that an individual’s ability to exercise some control 
over how the private sector gathers, disseminates and uses personal 
information is fundamental to an ordered society.15 Warren and 
Brandeis faced several conceptual difficulties in articulating their 
new right to informational privacy. For our purposes, the most 
fundamental difficulty went to the essence of the principle: What is 
“private”? The Fourth Amendment has historically been 
interpreted as incorporating a zero-sum conception of privacy in 
which only two states exist: private or not-private.16 However, this 
simplistic notion did not work for Warren and Brandeis because 
they were deeply concerned with how new technologies affected 
traditional understandings of privacy, particularly with regard to 
the capturing and exploiting of information that was in the public 
domain, such as photographs and descriptions of the activities of 
the social or political elite.17 In this vein, since it was Warren and 
Brandeis’s goal to control the collection, dissemination and use of 
information about individuals, they sought to redefine “privacy” to 
make it more consistent with and analogous to a property right.18 
The eventual adoption by virtually every U.S. state of the Warren-
Brandeis analysis demonstrates that such a redefinition was an 
essential consequence of the evolution of these particular 
                                                          
THE INTERNET 125, 138-39 (2000). Warren and Brandeis have been accused of 
being elitist, and they were primarily concerned about intrusions into the privacy 
of the “upper-crust,” both because they belonged to that society and because 
members of that society were primary targets for yellow journalists. See id. at 
135-36. 
15 See, e.g., Winters, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining how informational 
privacy is the ability of “individuals, groups or institutions to determine when, 
how and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”) 
(quoting WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, supra note 10). See also Westin, 
Social and Political Dimensions, supra note 10, at 431. See generally Gormley, 
supra note 10, at 1350. 
16 See Brenner, supra note 13, at __. 
17 See id. at __. 
18 See id. at __. See also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 10, at 198 (“[T]he 
legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed the common-
law right to intellectual and artistic property are, it is believed, but instances and 
applications of a general right to privacy, which properly understood afford a 
remedy for the evils under consideration.”). 
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technologies. 
The need for a similar redefinition is even more pressing today, 
as demonstrated by the national debate over privacy interests in 
data maintained by health care providers, financial institutions and 
retail merchants.19 Robert D. O’Harrow, Jr. has aptly captured the 
public’s concern over data privacy: 
Law enforcement and intelligence services don’t need to 
design their own surveillance systems . . . . They only have 
to reach out to the companies that already track us so well 
while promising better service, security, efficiency, and, 
perhaps most of all, convenience. It takes less and less 
effort each year to know what each of us is about. When we 
were at the coffee shop and where we went in our cars. 
What we wrote online, who we spoke to on the phone, the 
names of our friends and their friends and all the people 
they know. When we rode the subway, the candidates we 
supported, the books we read, the drugs we took, what we 
had for dinner, how we like our sex. 
 More than ever before, the details about our lives are no 
longer our own. They belong to the companies that collect 
them, and the government agencies that buy or demand 
them in the name of keeping us safe.20 
                                                          
19 See, e.g., ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND 
TRANSP., ONLINE PERSONAL PRIVACY ACT, S. REP. NO. 107-240 (2002) (Conf. 
Rep.); DIV. OF FIN. PRACTICES, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., U.S. FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PRIVACY ON-LINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy 
2000/privacy2000.pdf. 
20 ROBERT D. O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 300 (Free Press) (2005). 
Mr. O’Harrow is a reporter for The Washington Post and an associate of the 
Center for Investigative Reporting. He was a Pulitzer Prize finalist for articles 
on privacy and technology and a recipient of the 2003 Carnegie Mellon Cyber 
Security Reporting Award. The concern is, of course, that Government could 
apparently obtain such information by consent even though a number of federal 
statutes impose restrictions on the dissemination of various types of personal 
data. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 45 
C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2005); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 3405 
(2005); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 15 U.S.C.S. § 6802(e)(8) (2005); Electronic 
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Indeed, a recent survey of likely voters found that over 70% 
favored more legislation to protect the privacy of their Internet-
related communications and data.21 What created this heightened 
public concern? No doubt it was the creeping realization that data 
retention by the businesses from which we purchase the vast 
majority of our goods and services is not only pervasive, it is 
unavoidable. Such pervasive technology affects us not only when 
we venture into the public marketplaces, but it is intruding into our 
homes at an increasing rate.22 As computer technology becomes a 
                                                          
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703 (2005). These and 
similar statutory provisions are not determinative of the Fourth Amendment 
issues discussed here because (a) the restrictions they impose are usually less 
than those required by the Fourth Amendment and (b) they are far more fragile 
than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Peter Swire, Katz Is Dead. Long Live 
Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 916 (2004). What Congress gives, Congress can 
take away. Public awareness is another issue: the average American is unlikely 
to be aware of the provisions of these statutes (except, perhaps, to the extent that 
some require one to fill out paperwork), but does have at least a pragmatic grasp 
of Fourth Amendment guarantees. 
21 CYBER SECURITY INDUSTRY ALLIANCE, SURVEY RESEARCH ON VOTER 
ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNET SECURITY ISSUES (June 15, 2005), 
https://www.csialliance.org/resources/pdfs/CSIA_Survey_on_Spyware_and_Ide
ntity_Theft_White_Paper.PDF. 
22 See, e.g., “Pervasive Computing,” SeachNetworking.Com Definitions, 
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/gDefinition/0,294236,sid7_gci759337,0
0.html [hereinafter Pervasive Computing Definition] (last visited Oct. 31, 2005). 
Pervasive computing is the trend towards increasingly ubiquitous . . . 
connected computing devices in the environment, a trend being brought 
about by a convergence of advanced electronic – and particularly, 
wireless – technologies and the Internet. Pervasive computing devices 
are not personal computers as we tend to think of them, but very tiny – 
even invisible – devices, either mobile or embedded in almost any type 
of object imaginable, including cars, tools, appliances, clothing and 
various consumer goods – all communicating through increasingly 
interconnected networks. According to Dan Russell, director of the 
User Sciences and Experience Group at IBM’s Almaden Research 
Center, by 2010 computing will have become so naturalized within the 
environment that people will not even realize that they are using 
computers. Russell and other researchers expect that in the future smart 
devices all around us will maintain current information about their 
locations, the contexts in which they are being used, and relevant data 
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more and more embedded feature in every aspect of our lives, our 
homes are becoming equipped with technology that can be used to 
eavesdrop on our conversations and track our activities, even 
though such data collection and retention is not a primary purpose 
motivating its use.23 Indeed, such technology continues to be 
successful in the marketplace only because its information-
collection aspects are overshadowed by the benefits it provides 
Consumers.24 
                                                          
about the users. 
Id. 
23 See, e.g., Michael Kannellos, These Walls (and Teddy Bears) Have Eyes, 
CNET NEWS, June 9, 2005, http://news.com.com/These+walls+and+teddy+ 
bears+have+eyes/2100-1040_3-5738029.html (describing presentations given at 
Intel Corporation’s annual research day). Among the projects described were an 
experimental system, consisting of a series of sensors under a baby’s mattress 
and a camera mounted on a wall, which will monitor the child’s heart rate, 
temperature and movement; stream video of the infant; take pictures and send all 
the data to a parent’s PC or over the Internet to a remote location. Id. In another 
experiment discussed at the conference, researchers tagged all of the items in a 
person’s house with radio frequency identification sensors that effectively will 
tell a remote computer whether the occupant has moved a spoon or turned on the 
television. Id. 
 Dale Fuller, chief executive of Borland Software, recently described a 
vision of the future in which a person who had too much wine with dinner might 
find that his car might not start, and it might automatically call a cab, notify his 
spouse and even reschedule business appointments early the next morning. Ted 
Bridis, Top CEOs Describe Future Technologies, USA TODAY, June 10, 2005, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-06-10-tech-ceos_x.htm. 
24 See, e.g., Mahesh S. Raisinghani, et al., Ambient Intelligence: Changing 
Forms of Human-Computer Interaction and Their Social Implications, 5 J. OF 
DIGITAL INFO. (2004), available at http://jodi.ecs.soton. 
ac.uk/Articles/v05/i04/Raisinghani/. 
A young mother is on her way home, driving . . . with her 8-month old 
daughter who is sleeping in her child seat on the passenger side of the 
car. The infant is protected by an intelligent system called SBE 2 
against airbag deployment, which could be fatal in the case of an 
accident. SBE 2 detects when there is a child seat on the passenger seat 
instead of a person and automatically disables the airbag. Arriving 
home, a surveillance camera recognizes the young mother, 
automatically disables the alarm, unlocks the front door as she 
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For example, efforts are underway to develop “aware homes” 
that incorporate intelligent, embedded systems which interact with 
the occupants and with outside technology.25 An “aware home” 
will “be able to recognize the people that live in it, adapt . . . to 
them [and] learn from their behavior.”26 Similar systems will 
become features of offices, hotel rooms and other environments.27 
While the potential for abuses of the information-gathering 
capabilities of such products is particularly dramatic, the nature 
and sensitivity of the information gathered is often not inherently 
different from that acquired by mundane Collectors such as 
grocery and clothing retailers.28 
Pervasive technology raises difficult issues about privacy, 
especially for those who are not users of advanced technology.29 
                                                          
approaches it and turns on the lights to a level of brightness that the 
home control system has learned she likes. After dropping off her 
daughter, the young mother gets ready for grocery shopping. The 
intelligent refrigerator has studied the family’s food consumption over 
time and knows their preferences as well as what has been consumed 
since the last time she went shopping. This information has been 
recorded by an internal tracking system and wireless communication 
with the intelligent kitchen cabinets. Based on this information, the 
refrigerator automatically composes a shopping list, retrieves 
quotations for the items on the list from five different supermarkets in 
the neighborhood through an Internet link, sends an order to the one 
with the lowest offer and directs the young mother there. When arriving 
at the supermarket, the shopping cart has already been filled with the 
items on her shopping list. Spontaneously, she decides to add three 
more items to her cart and walks to the check-out. Instead of putting the 
goods on a belt, the entire cart gets checked out simply by running it 
past an RFID transponder that detects all items in the cart at once and 
sends that information to the cash register for processing. 
Id. 
25 See, e.g., THE AWARE HOME, supra note 6; AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE, 
supra note 6. See also Ward, supra note 6. 
26 AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE, supra note 6. See Kannellos, supra note 23. 
27 See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, SCENARIOS FOR AMBIENT INTELLIGENCE, 
supra note 6. 
28 See, e.g., Rob Walker, The Ad-Friendly World of Minority Report, June 
24, 2002, http://slate.msn.com/?id=2067293. 
29 See, e.g., Marc Langheinrich, Privacy by Design – Principles of Privacy-
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Most “old century” folks may think that their communications and 
activities are private only insofar as they shield them from 
observation by others. Such a view tends to associate “privacy” 
with enclaves such as our homes, our cars and our offices.30 Those 
                                                          
Aware Ubiquitous Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD INT’L CONFERENCE 
ON UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 273, 273 (G.D. Abowd et al. eds. 2001), available 
at http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/publ/papers/privacy-principles. pdf. 
What is it that makes ubiquitous computing any different from other 
computer science domains with respect to privacy? . . . Four properties 
come to mind: 
Ubiquity: Ubiquitous computing is everywhere – this is its essence, its 
explicit goal. Consequently, decisions made in ubiquitous system and 
artifact design will affect large, if not every part of our lives, [sic] from 
crossing a street to sitting in the living room to entering an office 
building. 
Invisibility: Not only should computers be everywhere, we want them 
to actually disappear from our views. With the ever shrinking form 
factor of computing and communication devices, this goal seems far 
from being science fiction. Naturally, we will [sic] going to have a hard 
time in the future deciding at what times we are interacting with (or are 
under surveillance by) a computing or communication device. 
Sensing: As computing technology shrinks and processing power 
increases, so does the abilities [sic] of sensors to accurately perceive 
certain aspects of the environment. Simple temperature, light, or noise 
sensors have been around for quite some time, but next generation 
sensors will allow high quality audio and video feeds from cameras and 
microphones smaller than buttons. Even emotional aspects of our lives, 
such as stress, fear, or excitement, could then be sensed with high 
accuracy by sensors embedded in our clothings [sic] or in our 
environment. 
Memory amplification: Advancements in speech and video processing, 
combined with the enhanced sensory equipment available soon, make it 
actually feasible to perceive memory prosthesis, or amplifiers, which 
can continuously and unobtrusively record every action, utterance and 
movement of ourselves and our surroundings, feeding them into a 
sophisticated back-end system that uses video and speech processing to 
allow us browsing and searching through our past. 
Id. 
30 In the Roving Interception case, the FBI proceeded under Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351 
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who are accustomed to using new technology, however, are rapidly 
experiencing a decline in the privacy traditionally associated with 
these enclaves. Cell phones have basically eliminated phone 
booths, vehicles are equipped with surveillance technology, 
wireless networks and cellular communications, and information 
concerning much of what goes on in our homes can be obtained by 
third parties. Offices may be somewhat more secure, but much of 
our work takes place outside our offices; “road warriors” equipped 
with the latest in wireless communication conduct business from—
and on their way to and from—other offices, and other places. The 
notion of “private enclaves” as places separate and apart from the 
world, areas in which our activities and communications are not 
subject to observation, is disappearing. 
In this world of ubiquitous, ambient technology, “an invisible 
and comprehensive surveillance network” has been created, the 
constituent parts of which are operated by private Collectors. This 
network has effectively eradicated the distinction between “public” 
and “private” spaces.31 Information that was historically secluded 
behind physical barriers now has the potential to leak into the 
public domain. 
This emerging surveillance network has profound implications 
for the way law enforcement agencies approach criminal 
investigations. Historically, investigations involved locating the 
                                                          
(1968). Company v. United States (In re United States), 349 F.3d 1132, 1136 
(9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Roving Interception]. Since Title III applies only 
when one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communications at 
issue, the FBI either (i) operated on the assumption that the interior of the 
vehicle was a “private” enclave requiring a warrant to access or (ii) proceeded 
under Title III because the agents needed the cooperation of the Company to 
exploit the System for eavesdropping purposes. Id. at 1136, 1145. 
31 See Kannellos, supra note 23. See also O’HARROW, supra note 20, at 
291. 
Before long, our phones, laptop computers, PalmPilots, watches, 
pagers, and much more will play parts in the most efficient surveillance 
network ever made. Forget dropping a coin into a parking meter or 
using a pay phone discreetly on the street. Those days are slipping by. 
The most simple, anonymous transactions are now becoming datapoints 
on the vast and growing matrix of each of our lives. 
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presumptive situs of physical “evidence”32 and then taking 
affirmative steps to find and seize that evidence.33 The scenario 
had two notable characteristics. First, officers would traditionally 
seek evidence of a specific crime which they believed had been 
committed by a specific person; this focus circumscribed the scope 
of their efforts.34 Second, officers would attempt to seek out and 
collect evidence from places associated with the suspect (because 
physical evidence necessarily resides in a “place”).35 Fourth 
Amendment analysis has consequently focused on the interaction 
between the officers and the suspect; the concern has been with 
controlling the process by which officers intrude into that person’s 
private spaces.36 The procedures devised to prevent “unwarranted” 
intrusions into personal, private spaces including strict criteria for 
obtaining search warrants supported by probable cause or an 
exception and rules narrowing the scope of authorized searches 
(i.e., the “plain view” doctrine), all reflect this.37 Evidence-
                                                          
Id. 
32 The “evidence” consists of items of tangible or intangible personal 
property. This includes bodily substances. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966). 
33 See Brenner, supra note 13, at notes __ & accompanying text. 
34 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) (4th ed. 2005). 
35 Law enforcement may also seek evidence from those associated with 
suspects, as well as from suspects; indeed, officers may seek evidence from 
“civilians,” i.e., those who have no involvement in the suspected criminal 
activity. That does not alter the structure of the dynamic outlined above. In all of 
these scenarios—law enforcement searches suspect’s premises, law enforcement 
searches premises belonging to suspect’s associate and law enforcement 
searches “civilian” premises—the inquiry is whether law enforcement violated 
the privacy of the person or persons whose premises were the object of a search. 
The focus is on law enforcement officers’ actively targeting someone’s premises 
(Boyd) or activity (Katz) for scrutiny. See supra Part II(A). If the officers violate 
someone’s privacy, they can move to suppress the evidence, if any, resulting 
from the violation or bring a civil rights suit seeking damages for the violation. 
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 554-56 (2004). 
36 See Brenner, supra note 13, at notes __ & accompanying text. 
37 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)-(d), (e); LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 
2.2(a). This assumption is also embedded in Title III, the legislative product of 
BRENNER MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006 12:35 PM 
226 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
gathering that does not intrude into such space is outside the 
Fourth Amendment, at least as far as the object of the search is 
concerned.38 
Now, consider how this dynamic changes in a world of 
ubiquitous technology. In many ways, surveillance and 
investigation have merged. The data gathered by a surveillance 
network of the type outlined above,39 along with the data 
Consumers generate through online or wireless communication 
activities, provide tremendous opportunities for law enforcement to 
“round up the usual suspects” even before a specific crime is 
reported.40 Instead of having to search for discrete bits of 
                                                          
Katz. Title III’s wiretap provisions specify that the transmission of the contents 
of communications is not to be interrupted by “interception;” this is simply an 
application of the Jackson principle. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 – 2522 (2005). See 
also infra Part II.A. Instead of using an adhesive envelope, one relies upon 
communication systems that, it has heretofore been reasonable to assume, are 
“closed” to the general public. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice – Computer 
Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Searching and Seizing Computers and 
Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations § IV(A) (2002), 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/s&smanual2002.htm#_IVA_. 
Since its enactment in 1968 . . . Title III has provided the statutory 
framework that governs real-time electronic surveillance of the 
contents of communications. When agents want to wiretap a suspect’s 
phone, “keystroke” a hacker breaking into a computer system, or accept 
the fruits of wiretapping by a private citizen who has discovered 
evidence of a crime, the agents first must consider the implications of 
Title III. 
 The structure of Title III is surprisingly simple. The statute’s drafters 
assumed that every private communication could be modeled as a two-
way connection between two participating parties, such as a telephone 
call between A and B. At a fundamental level, the statute prohibits a 
third party (such as the government) who is not a participating party to 
the communication from intercepting private communications between 
the parties using an “electronic, mechanical, or other device,” unless 
one of several statutory exceptions applies. 
Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2005). 
38 See Brenner, supra note 13, at notes __ & accompanying text. 
39 See supra notes 30–32 & accompanying text. 
40 The data gathered by these sources can be divided into three broad 
categories: 
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(i) Tool Data 
 Tool data encompasses personal information that is valued not for its 
content but for its utility. It includes Social Security numbers, dates of birth, 
driver’s license numbers and other data; it will no doubt come to include 
biometric identifiers such as DNA. Tool data is a given; it is not the product of 
my will or effort but is assigned, more or less arbitrarily, to me. Tool data has 
“value” because it is an implement that can be used for good or evil: My Social 
Security number, for example, is a tool I can use to identify myself for various 
benign purposes (positive value) and one a criminal can use to steal my identity 
(negative value). See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1986). 
 Though tool data is something I “receive,” it is not inherently “public.” My 
Social Security number and date of birth may be “public,” in that I have shared 
them with others, but that is not inevitable; like the other types of tool data in 
current circulation, they are “public” because we have not conceptualized tool 
data as a commodity that has “value” and must therefore be protected. The need 
for, and use of, tool data is a historical accident, an ad hoc solution to the 
complexity of modern society; we use tool data to identify (“I am Susan 
Brenner”) and authenticate (“Here is proof I am Susan Brenner”). See, e.g., 
BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR 182-95 (2003). For most of human history, 
these functions were relational; people were born, raised and lived their lives in 
the same community, where everyone knew and recognized them. See generally 
id. at 184. As populations became increasingly mobile and urbanized, relational 
identification and authentication no longer sufficed; it became necessary to find 
some surrogate, and that is what Social Security numbers, driver’s licenses and 
other personal data became. See, e.g., Matt Sundeen, License to Drive = Proof 
of Identity, STATE LEGISLATURES, Apr. 2003, at 21. 
 
(ii) Biographical Data 
 Biographical data derives from my activities in real- and cyber-space; it 
includes where I live and where I have lived, where I work and where I have 
worked, the car I drive, the routines I follow and the places and people I visit. 
Biographical data is considered “public” because it is the product of my 
behavior in “public” places, where what I do can be observed by anyone who 
shares that space with me. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 
(N.H. 2003). Consequently, biographical data, defined as information which was 
or could have been obtained by observing activity in a “public” place, is not 
private under Katz or under cognate tests used to implement civil privacy 
protections. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983); 
Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1009. As Part II explained, the implementation of 
ubiquitous technology makes the assumptions underlying this category 
increasingly problematic because it is based on a purely spatial bifurcation of 
“public” and “private.” 
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 (iii) Transactional Data 
 Transactional data is generated by our interactions with others. In analyzing 
the privacy of transactional data, it is useful to divide it into two types: (a) 
professional transactional data, which results from interactions with attorneys, 
physicians, religious advisors, psychiatrists, accountants and other professionals; 
and (b) commercial transactional data, which results from interactions with 
those who provide commercial goods or services offline or online. There are 
certain constants across these categories: Each generates data which establishes 
(i) that I interacted with a particular professional or commercial resource on one 
or more occasions, (ii) the nature of that interaction (seeking legal advice, 
making a purchase) and (iii) the details of that interaction (seeking legal advice 
about an estate, purchasing vitamins or electronics or clothing). None of this 
data is private under the Katz test or cognate civil standards because by 
interacting with external entities (human or automated) I have knowingly 
exposed (i)-(iii) to public view; I assumed the risk that those with whom I 
interact will reveal the details of that interaction to others. 
 There can be some overlap between transactional data and biographical 
data. To understand why, it is useful to consider two real-world transactions: In 
the first, I consult with an attorney whose office is in my neighborhood; in the 
second, I purchase a prescription from a pharmacist at my local drug store. My 
traveling to the law office and to the drug store takes place in “public,” and so 
can be considered biographical data. It is also transactional data insofar as it 
shows that I interacted with the lawyer and with the pharmacist. These 
respective encounters differ somewhat in the extent to which the nature and 
details of the interactions are biographical. My purchasing a prescription from 
the pharmacist takes place in “public,” and so the nature of the transaction tends 
toward the biographical; but the details of the purchase will remain confidential 
unless I choose to share them or unless the pharmacist is indiscreet enough to 
announce the nature and uses of the medication I buy. Since it is reasonable to 
infer that I went to a law office to obtain legal advice, the nature of that 
transaction also tends towards the biographical; but since the transaction itself 
does not take place in “public,” the details do not constitute biographical data. 
 The law has treated the categories differently: Professional interactions are 
usually encompassed by privileges that bar the professional from revealing 
details of the interaction without the client’s permission; the purpose is to 
provide confidentiality when it is “essential to the full and satisfactory 
maintenance of the relationship between the parties.” PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & 
SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1.1 (2d ed. 2004). For 
commercial interactions, the general rule is that “the facts of a transaction 
belong jointly and severally to the participants. If Alice buys a chattel from Bob, 
ordinarily both Alice and Bob are free to disclose this fact.” A. Michael 
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information from a disjointed array of physical sources, officers 
can “harvest” information held by these private Collectors.41 The 
harvest can occur either as a result of Government’s purchase of 
                                                          
Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1521-22 (2000) 
(noting that a “very small number of statutes impose limits upon the sharing of 
private transactional data collected by persons not classed as professionals”). 
Neither type of transactional data is private in the constitutional-common law 
sense, but the evidentiary and other constraints American law places on the 
dissemination of data resulting from professional interactions limit its 
circulation to those involved in the professional consultation; therefore, while 
professional transactional data is not private, it is secured. 
41 See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible 
Handshake: The Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 6, ¶¶ 2-3 (2003). 
The Internet was initiated by the State, and soon after was 
privatized . . . . Market powers . . . facilitated the rise of new 
players . . . who gained power and control in the information 
environment . . . . A convergence of interests seems to be developing 
among players such as copyright owners and service providers on the 
one hand, and the State’s growing interest in the digital environment, 
on the other hand. Law enforcement agencies seek to enhance their 
monitoring capacity and online businesses seek to prevent fraud and 
combat piracy while strengthening their ties with authorities. This 
convergence might lead to an unholy alliance with potentially 
troublesome results . . . . 
 The most explicit example . . . is reflected in a presentation by Joseph 
E. Sullivan, director of compliance and law enforcement relations at 
eBay. Addressing law enforcement agents at a conference on 
cybercrime, Sullivan offered to hand over information, when 
requested . . . . eBay is one of the largest online e-commerce 
businesses, and the owner of PayPal, which provides clearing services 
for online financial transactions. eBay controls access to a colossal 
amount of information, including financial records, names, user IDs 
and passwords, affiliations, e-mail addresses, physical addresses, 
shipping information, contact information, and transaction information 
(i.e., bidding history, prices paid, feedback rating). But eBay is not 
alone in implementing law enforcement-friendly policy. The emerging 
regime of recent years facilitates cooperation between the State and the 
private sector in law enforcement efforts, beyond the reach of judicial 
review. 
Id. 
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data or from a “request.” Either way, the Government’s ability to 
obtain and sift huge amounts of Consumer data without any reason 
to believe a crime has been committed dwarfs anything that could 
have been accomplished by the general warrant procedure that led 
to adoption of the Fourth Amendment.42 
A fairly recent Ninth Circuit case illustrates how far we have 
come. In re U.S. for an Order Authorizing Roving Interception of 
                                                          
42 Brenner, supra note 13, at __. See Florence Olsen, Lawmakers Have 
Tough Questions for Largely Unregulated Data Firms, Federal Computer Week 
(Apr. 25, 2005), http://www.fcw.com/ article88676. 
FBI officials spent $75 million last year for information from data 
aggregators, a fast-growing and largely unregulated market . . . . 
 The FBI buys information from data aggregators ChoicePoint, credit 
bureau reporting companies, Dun and Bradstreet, LexisNexis, the 
National Insurance Crime Bureau and Westlaw, which agents use 
mainly for convenience, said Chris Swecker, assistant director of the 
FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division. 
 “Twenty-three years ago when I first came to the FBI, I had to walk 
down to the courthouse to get courthouse records and go other places to 
collect these records,” Swecker said. “Being able to make one query 
and get all these records at one time saves investigative time and saves 
resources,” he said. 
 Records that the FBI finds useful include driver’s license 
information, last known address, date of birth, court filings, liens and 
newspaper records, Swecker said, adding that FBI officials conducted 
1.2 million queries in the ChoicePoint database in 2004. 
 Privacy experts say federal agencies’ use of commercial databases 
creates a problem. “It allows them . . . to outsource data-collection 
activities,” said James Dempsey, executive director of the . . . Center 
for Democracy and Technology. If federal officials start a new 
collection of data, they must comply with the Privacy Act, which 
requires agencies to perform a privacy impact assessment, Dempsey 
told the committee. But when government officials buy that data or 
subscribe to data that they don’t pull into a government database, none 
of the Privacy Act rules apply, Dempsey said . . . . 
 Sen. Russell Feingold . . . said he is concerned there are no 
guidelines to ensure that information in commercial databases is used 
responsibly. Without restrictions, there is nothing to prevent federal 
agencies from using commercial data “for privacy-intrusive data-
mining programs,” he said. 
Id. 
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Oral Communications43 arose from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s efforts to use technology integrated into a private 
vehicle to intercept conversations taking place within it.44 As the 
Ninth Circuit explained, some vehicles are equipped with 
“telecommunication devices” that assist with navigation or with 
“emergencies or obtaining road-side assistance. Such systems 
operate via a combination of GPS . . . and cellular technology.”45 
The appellant in the case (the Company) operated one such service 
(the System).46 One feature of the System let the Company open a 
cellular connection to a vehicle and listen to conversations in the 
car.47 The purpose was to help recover stolen vehicles, but it could 
also be used to eavesdrop on legitimate conversations conducted in 
a vehicle equipped with the System.48 Realizing this, the FBI 
obtained “orders requiring the Company to assist in intercepting 
conversations taking place in a car equipped with the System.”49 
The FBI in effect “harvested” the conversations held in the 
target vehicle. This case highlights issues we will face as 
technology becomes an increasingly pervasive feature of our 
lives.50 We have for many decades assumed that a vehicle is a 
private place; fictional characters often take advantage of the 
privacy a vehicle offers to discuss sensitive matters.51 The privacy 
                                                          
43 349 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003). 
44 Law enforcement installation of listening devices in vehicles is far from 
novel. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (detailing how in 
1959, federal agents installed a “Schmidt radio transmitter” under the front seat 
of a car and used it to listen in on conversations held by the occupants of the 
vehicle). 
45 Roving Interception, 349 F.3d at 1133. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1133-34. 
49 Id. at 1134. 
50 See, e.g., Centre for Pervasive Computing, http://www.pervasive.dk/. 
51 In the Roving Interception case, the court focused exclusively on a 
specific statutory structure created for the authorization and implementation of 
wiretaps, so the question of whether the interior of the vehicle was a “private” 
place was not raised, though it was presumably assumed. Roving Interception, 
349 F.3d at 1133. 
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of vehicles has, of course, been compromised on occasion;52 while 
we might be aware, at some level, that cars could be “bugged,” we 
could not imagine that our vehicles would themselves become 
instruments of surveillance. 
If cars can become instruments of surveillance, what about our 
homes? The case discussed above illustrates a trend—the 
pervasiveness of technology—that will surely find its way into our 
homes.53 As computer technology increasingly becomes 
entrenched in every phase of our lives, our homes, too, will come 
equipped with technology that can be used to eavesdrop on our 
conversations and track our activities; interactive electronic 
devices will be embedded in appliances, clothing, furniture and the 
home itself.54 Interacting with these embedded technologies will 
become a necessary and inevitable aspect of our lives; our home 
will regulate the internal environment, order groceries and arrange 
for other essential services without being asked to do so.55 While 
these technologies will make our lives easier, they will also 
                                                          
52 See supra note 43-49 & accompanying text. 
53 See, e.g., Pervasive Computing Definition, supra note 22. 
54 See Kannellos, supra note 23 & accompanying text. See also Marc 
Langheinrich et al., Living in a Smart Environment: Implications for the Coming 
Ubiquitous Information Society, 15 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REV. 5 (Feb. 2005), 
available at http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/publ/papers/sktelecom 2005.pdf. 
By virtue of its very definitions, the vision of ubiquitous computing has 
the potential to create an invisible and comprehensive surveillance 
network, covering an unprecedented share of our public and private 
life: “The old sayings that ‘the walls have ears’ and ‘if these walls 
could talk’ have become the disturbing reality. The world is filled with 
all-knowing, all-reporting things.” . . . Today’s economic reality – 
shopping without participating in comprehensive profiling [–] . . . 
might become an expensive luxury for well-off citizens. 
(quoting R. Lucky, Everything Will Be Connected To Everything Else, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (Mar. 1999), http://www.argreenhouse.com/papers/rlucky/ spectrum/ 
connect.shtml). 
55 See, e.g., Kelly Greene, Take A Glimpse Inside the Home of the Future, 
REAL ESTATE JOURNAL (May 24, 2004), http://www. 
realestatejournal.com/housegarden/indoorliving/20040524-greene.html. See also 
Mark Weiser, Open House (Mar 1996), http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/ 
~matthew/lectures/HCI4/ weiserOpenhouse.pdf. 
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“broadcast” personal information to a variety of external sources. 
Like the System, this technology will be included because it 
has other valuable uses.56 And like the System, much of this 
technology will operate below our personal radar; that is, like the 
driver and passengers upon whom the FBI eavesdropped, we will 
remain unaware that embedded technology is tracking and 
preserving the details of our actions, our conversations and even 
our vital signs. 
With pervasive technology, the focus on privacy shifts from 
intrusions into spaces under the Consumer’s temporary or 
permanent control, to the acquisition of information from sources 
over which the Consumer has contractual rights but no effective ex 
ante control or even a right of access to the database containing the 
stored information.57 This “harvesting” scenario represents a 
twenty-first century variation of the “assault on the castle” scenario 
                                                          
56 See, e.g., Raisinghani, supra note 24. 
57 We do not mean to suggest that this information “harvesting” scenario 
will supplant the traditional dynamic of Government intrusions into privacy. We 
are physical beings and, as such, will continue to act, and to generate physical 
evidence, in the real-world; the primary locus of evidence for traditional crimes 
such as rape, murder and drug trafficking will no doubt remain in the real-world. 
But even those crimes may involve stored transactional data. See, e.g., Eric 
Weslander, Web Evidence Used in Murder Hearing, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-
WORLD (Kansas), Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://www.ljworld.com/section/ 
crime_fire/story/189998. 
The case of a Kansas State University professor charged with 
murdering his ex-wife headed into uncharted legal territory Thursday as 
prosecutors presented evidence of an Internet search history from the 
suspect’s computers . . . . 
 A Lawrence Police detective who examined computers seized from 
Thomas E. Murray testified that in the month before Carmin D. Ross’ 
killing, Murray’s computers had been used to search the Internet for 
phrases that included “how to hire an assassin,” “how to kill someone 
quickly and quietly” and “how to murder someone and not get caught.” 
Id. The detective “testified that even though Murray appeared to use his 
computer regularly on Thursday mornings, there was virtually no file activity on 
Murray’s computers the morning of Nov. 13, 2003, the day prosecutors allege 
he drove to Lawrence and stabbed and beat Ross to death.” Id. 
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that ultimately prompted the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.58 
To understand this scenario, and its relationship to the 
“harvesting” scenario, we need to briefly review the history of the 
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment is intended to protect 
the sanctity of private property from intrusions by public 
officials;59 its concern with protecting private property derives 
from common law. 
Early English common law punished “those who invaded a 
neighbor’s premises.”60 By the twelfth century housebreaking was 
one “of the more serious crimes in medieval England,” and by the 
sixteenth century English law had developed specific prohibitions 
against housebreaking, burglary and trespass.61 These laws were 
concerned only with trespasses by private persons because official 
searches of private premises were almost unknown until the 
fifteenth century.62 In the latter half of the fifteenth century, the 
King and Parliament began authorizing trade guilds to “enter and 
search the workmanship of all manner of persons” to enforce guild 
regulations.63 Roughly a century later, the Court of the Star 
Chamber, charged with licensing books and regulating printing 
[D]ecreed that the wardens of the Stationers’ Company . . . 
should have authority to open all packs and trunks of 
papers and books brought into the country, to search in any 
warehouse, shop, or any other place where they suspected a 
violation of the laws of printing to be taking place [and] to 
                                                          
58 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609-10 (1999). 
59 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886). 
60 See, e.g., William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and 
Original Meaning 32 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont 
Graduate School) (on file with author). 
61 Id. at 31-35. 
62 Id. at 36, 75. A law enacted in 1335 required innkeepers in ports to 
search guests for counterfeit money; the innkeepers kept a portion of whatever 
they found and turned the rest over to “official searchers” who took the rest and 
monitored the innkeepers’ discharge of this obligation. See LASSON, supra note 
5, at 23. 
63 See LASSON, supra note 5, at 24. 
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seize the books printed contrary to law.”64 
Other courts followed suit, issuing edicts authorizing similar 
searches directed at those suspected of libel, heresy and political 
dissent.65 This led to the evolution of the general warrant, which 
these courts issued with no proof of individualized suspicion and in 
which no “names are specified . . . and . . . a discretionary power 
was given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may 
chance to fall.”66 As arbitrary searches became more common, 
“Englishmen began to insist that their houses were castles for the 
paradoxical reason that the castle-like security that those houses 
had afforded from intrusion was vanishing.”67 
In the eighteenth century, English courts responded to citizens’ 
concern about “assaults on their castles” by issuing a series of 
decisions that held that homes were protected from arbitrary action 
by government officials.68 Most of these decisions grew out of one 
infamous investigation of seditious libel. Ordered to find the author 
of a recently-published letter, officers acting under the authority of 
a general warrant searched five houses and made a number of 
arrests.69 Those whose homes were searched sued the officers who 
conducted the searches for trespass, and the government 
“undertook the responsibility of defending all actions arising from 
the warrant and the payment of all judgments.”70 To the delight of 
                                                          
64 Id. at 25. The Stationers’ Company was a guild of printers charged with 
enforcing the Star Chamber’s restrictions on printing. See, e.g., TELFORD 
TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 25 (1969). 
65 See LASSON, supra note 5, at 25-27. “No limitations seem to have been 
observed in giving messengers powers of search . . . in ferreting out . . . 
evidence. Persons and places were not necessarily specified, seizure of papers 
and effects was indiscriminate, everything was left to the discretion of the bearer 
of the warrant.” Id. at 26. See also Cuddihy, supra note 60, at 100-19. 
66 LASSON, supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 
(C.P. 1763)). 
67 Cuddihy, supra note 60, at 128. See LASSON, supra note 5, at 30-45. 
68 See Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1765); Entick v. 
Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765); Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 489; Huckle v. 
Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763). 
69 See LASSON, supra note 5, at 43-45. 
70 Id. at 45. 
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the British public, the plaintiffs won, and their verdicts were 
upheld on appeal.71 Encouraged by their success, John Entick, the 
victim of a similar search, sued the officers who searched his home 
for trespass and won a verdict of £300.72 The Court of Common 
Pleas upheld the verdict: 
Our law holds the property of every man so sacred that no 
man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close without his 
leave; if he does, he is a trespasser . . . . The defendants 
have no right to avail themselves of . . . these warrants . . . . 
[W]e can safely say there is no law in this country to justify 
the defendants in what they have done; if there was, it 
would destroy all the comforts of society.73 
The effect of the Entick opinion and other decisions was to apply 
the same standard to public and private actors: In either instance, a 
trespasser could be held civilly liable for entering another’s 
property “without a lawful authority.”74 
The English notion that “a man’s house was his castle” came to 
America with the colonists.75 “Between 1754 and 1788, Americans 
often resorted to house-as-castle rhetoric in condemning excise 
taxes, general warrants and writs of assistance, a type of those 
warrants that was used to collect import duties.”76 The colonists 
were particularly outraged by the writs of assistance, and waged an 
unsuccessful legal battle against them during this period.77 The 
resentment these writs generated was a driving factor in the 
Revolution and, later, in the adoption of bills of rights by states and 
                                                          
71 See id. at 44-46. 
72 See id. at 47. See also Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 807-08. 
73 Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817. 
74 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, III COMMENTARIES ON ENGLISH LAW 163, 
(William Morrison, ed., 2001). 
75 See Cuddihy, supra note 60, at xcvi (“[T]he familiar quotation appeared 
in the colonies no later than 1647, in Rhode Island’s first code of laws.”). 
76 Id. at xcvii. 
77 See, e.g., LASSON, supra note 5, 51-61. “[A]ny person who was 
authorized by a writ of assistance” was permitted to “search any house, shop, 
warehouse, etc.; break open doors, chests, packages, . . . and remove any 
prohibited or uncustomed goods or merchandise.” Id. at 53. 
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by the federal government.78 The Fourth Amendment was 
therefore a product of the same concerns that resulted in the law of 
trespass being applied to public actors: “to guard individuals 
against improper intrusion into their buildings where they had the 
exclusive right of possession.”79 It was intended to secure spatial 
privacy—to restrict law enforcement’s ability to break down doors 
and rummage through rooms, boxes, chests and drawers. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THIRD PARTY RECORDS AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES 
We now turn to the Supreme Court’s approach to the privacy 
of third party records, which arose in situations far different from 
that presented by current electronic database technology. The 
sections below address that approach in two steps. Section A 
describes how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment’s applicability to searches and seizures of 
transactional records held by third parties in light of twentieth 
century technological advances.80 Section B explains why that 
                                                          
78 See id. at 51-61, 79-82. See also Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 310-11 (1978) (“[The] Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large 
measure out of the colonists’ experience with the writs of assistance . . . [that] 
granted sweeping power to customs officials and other agents of the King to 
search at large for smuggled goods.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
79 Jones v. Gibson, 1 N.H. 266, 272 (1818). 
80 The discussion of Supreme Court cases in this section is selective: It is 
limited to cases that have dealt with the use of new communicative technologies, 
as defined in note 1, supra. The Court has used the Katz standard to decide 
whether a wide variety of police conduct constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (holding 
that it is not a search for police to fly over a greenhouse in a helicopter and 
observe marijuana plants through gaps in its roof); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that it is not a search for police to fly over a 
backyard in commercial airspace and view marijuana being grown there); Dow 
Chemical v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that it is not a 
search to fly over a chemical plant and photograph the premises). The 
“technologies” at issue in these cases were simply tools police used to gain a 
favorable physical vantage point from which to make observations with the 
unaided, or aided, naked eye; these cases did not involve the type of pervasive, 
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approach is inadequate to protect the societal interest in 
maintaining the privacy of digital transactional data. 
A. Third Party Records and Twentieth Century Technology 
The Supreme Court has addressed the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to communicative technologies only a handful of 
times in the last fifty years. Even more disappointing is that the 
Court has addressed these issues in an inconsistent and 
unprincipled manner.81 The foundational case is Katz v. United 
States,82 a 1967 case in which the Court held that warrantless 
Government wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby 
overruling its 1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States.83 
Katz was convicted of violating 18 U.S. Code § 1084, which 
makes it a crime to use facilities of interstate commerce to transmit 
wagering information.84 The conviction was based on six tape 
recordings which were obtained by means of an electronic 
listening device attached to the outside of the public telephone 
booth.85 The authorities conducted the eavesdropping after 
discovering that Katz used these phones to call a know gambler. 
Notwithstanding this information, the authorities made no effort to 
obtain judicial authorization for the eavesdropping.86 
Katz raised two issues in his appeal, both of which involved the 
relationship between the Fourth Amendment and a 
“constitutionally protected area.”87 The Court declined to accept 
                                                          
autonomous technologies analyzed in this article. 
81 For an extensive examination of the Court’s decisions addressing privacy 
interests as affected by advances in communicative technologies, see Brenner, 
supra note 13, at __. 
82 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
83 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
84 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49. 
85 Id. at 354 n.14. 
86 Electronic Surveillance, 82 HARV. L. REV. 187, 187-88 (1968). 
87 Katz, 389 U.S. at 349-51. To this point in history, Fourth Amendment 
violations occurred only when there was a physical trespass onto a 
“constitutionally protected area.” See, e.g., Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and 
Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 793 n.20 (1999). In an attempt to come within that 
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his formulation, explaining that the resolution of “Fourth 
Amendment problems is not . . . promoted by incantation of the 
phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’”88 The majority went on to 
announce a new Fourth Amendment standard: 
[T]he parties have attached great significance to the . . . 
telephone booth from which the petitioner placed his calls. 
The petitioner has . . . argued that the booth was a 
“constitutionally protected area.” The government has 
maintained . . . that it was not. But this effort . . . deflects 
attention from the problem presented by this case. For the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection . . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.89 
In an important concurrence, Justice Harlan articulated the 
standard that has been used in later decisions to implement the 
Katz holding:90 
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.” The question . . . is what 
protection it affords to those people . . . . My understanding 
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that 
there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
                                                          
doctrine, Katz argued that when he 
occupied [the phone booth] for the purpose of engaging in a personal 
conversation and closed the door to the booth, he [was] in effect in his 
own residence. By invitation from the telephone company and the 
payment of the toll he says he is entitled to consider the booth protected 
from intrusion by the Fourth Amendment. 
Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 133 (9th Cir. 1966), reversed by 389 U.S. 
347 (1967). 
88 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
89 Id. at 351 (citations omitted, emphasis added). 
90 The Court adopted Harlan’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard 
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), and has applied it ever since. 
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second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus a man’s home is, for 
most purposes, a place where he expects privacy . . . . On 
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be 
protected against being overheard, for the expectation of 
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.91 
Katz, of course, involved the interception of the contents of 
communications between two individuals, not government seizures 
of records held by third parties. But since the Katz Court 
characterized its holding as the general standard that would be used 
to determine whether a Fourth Amendment right to privacy 
existed, Katz shaped how the Court approaches third-party records, 
as well as real-time personal communications. 
In the next dozen years, the Supreme Court twice considered 
whether the Fourth Amendment applies when Government obtains 
records pertaining to an individual that are generated and held by a 
party with whom the individual has commercial dealings. In the 
parlance of this article, the question was whether Government 
could obtain without a warrant Data generated and maintained by a 
Collector reflecting transactions between the Collector and the 
Consumer/defendant. In United States v. Miller,92 Miller, who had 
been indicted on tax charges, moved to suppress records 
concerning his bank account; federal agents had obtained the 
records by using a grand jury subpoena, not a warrant.93 The Court 
                                                          
91 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). It is 
important to note that Justice Harlan interpreted the majority’s opinion as 
holding “only” (i) that a telephone booth is an area in which one “has a 
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy;” (ii) that electronic 
invasions, as well as physical invasions, of such an area can violate the Fourth 
Amendment; and (iii) that the invasion of a “constitutionally protected area” 
without a warrant is presumptively unreasonable. Id. at 360-61. His standard 
therefore implicitly incorporates the spatially-based conception of privacy that 
had prevailed since Olmstead. Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928). This 
is evident in his comment that the rule he cites “emerged from prior decisions.” 
See supra note 91 & accompanying text. Those decisions were, by necessity, 
based on Olmstead’s trespass doctrine. 
92 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976). 
93 Id. at 437. 
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the agents had 
“improperly circumvented” his Fourth Amendment rights.94 The 
Supreme Court in 1976 disagreed: “We find that there was no 
intrusion into any area in which respondent had a protected Fourth 
Amendment interest and that the District Court therefore correctly 
denied respondent’s motion to suppress.”95 This post-Katz Court 
cited a pre-Katz opinion for the proposition that “‘no interest 
legitimately protected by the Fourth Amendment’ is implicated by 
governmental investigative activities unless there is an intrusion 
into a zone of privacy, into ‘the security a man relies upon when he 
places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected 
area.’”96 Katz, of course, rejected the use of “constitutionally 
protected area” as the touchstone of Fourth Amendment privacy. 
The Miller Court also noted that “the documents subpoenaed here 
are not respondent’s ‘private papers.’ . . . [R]espondent can assert 
neither ownership nor possession. Instead, these are the business 
records of the banks.”97 
In Miller, the Court clearly misapplied its own precedent. First 
its focus on a “constitutionally protected area” ignored Katz’s 
statement that the Fourth Amendment protects “people and not 
places.”98 Second, by focusing on the owner of property, the Court 
ignored the holding of United States v. Matlock99 that the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment do not rest upon the law of 
                                                          
94 Id. at 438. 
95 Id. at 440. 
96 Id. (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1966)). 
97 Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. The Miller Court’s only references to Katz came 
in the paragraph in which it addressed Miller’s reliance on the Katz Court’s 
statement that “we have . . . departed from the narrow view” that “‘property 
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize.’” 425 U.S. at 
442 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (quoting Warden 
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). The Miller Court dismissed this aspect of 
Katz, noting that the Katz Court “stressed that ‘[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.’” 
425 U.S. at 442 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). The Miller Court then 
proceeded to base its holding on the Katz “assumption of risk” principle. Id. 
98 See supra note 89 & accompanying text. 
99 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
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property, “with its attendant historical and legal refinements.”100 
The question the Court should have addressed was not to whom 
the records belonged, but whether it is in our society’s interest to 
condition a Consumer’s use of the nation’s banking system on a 
waiver of his Fourth Amendment privacy. 
Three years later, the Court decided Smith v. Maryland.101 
Smith was the “other half” of Katz; the issue was “whether the 
installation and use of a pen register,” which captures the numbers 
dialed on a telephone, “constitutes a ‘search’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.”102 The Smith Court began its opinion by 
reviewing Katz and noting that the standard used to implement 
Katz is the two-pronged test Justice Harlan enunciated in his 
concurring opinion: (i) whether the individual has exhibited a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the thing, place or endeavor; 
and (ii) whether society is prepared to regard the individual’s 
subjective expectation of privacy, if any, as reasonable.103 
The Court found that Smith met neither criterion: 
Since the pen register was installed on telephone company 
property at the telephone company’s central offices, 
petitioner . . . cannot claim that his “property” was invaded 
or that police intruded into a “constitutionally protected 
area.” Petitioner’s claim . . . is that, notwithstanding the 
absence of a trespass, the State . . . infringed a “legitimate 
expectation of privacy”. . . . [A] pen register differs . . . 
from the listening device employed in Katz, for pen 
registers do not acquire the contents of 
                                                          
100 Id. at 172 n.7. The issue in Matlock was whether one’s authority to 
consent to a search by law enforcement derived from a property interest in the 
place or thing to be searched. Id. The case involved the validity of a consent to 
search given by the co-occupant of a house. Id. at 166. Since the co-occupant 
was neither the owner nor the lessor of the property, her consent to search would 
not have been valid if the authority to consent was a function of her having a 
property interest in the house. As noted above, the Supreme Court rejected this 
narrow interpretation of one’s authority to consent to a search, to an invasion of 
privacy, in favor of a broader standard. Id. at 172. 
101 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
102 Id. at 736. 
103 Id. at 740. See infra Part II.B.3. 
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communications . . .  
    [P]etitioner’s argument that its installation and use 
constituted a “search” necessarily rests upon a claim that he 
had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” regarding the 
numbers he dialed on his phone . . . . 
    [W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual 
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All 
telephone users realize that they must “convey” phone 
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through 
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are 
completed. All subscribers realize . . . that the phone 
company has facilities for making permanent records of the 
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance 
(toll) calls on their monthly bills . . . . Telephone users, in 
sum, typically know that they must convey numerical 
information to the phone company; that the phone company 
has facilities for recording this information; and that the 
phone company does in fact record this information for a 
variety of legitimate business purposes. Although 
subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is 
too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these 
circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the 
numbers they dial will remain secret.104 
The Court also rejected Smith’s claim that he demonstrated a 
subjective expectation of privacy by making the calls from his 
home,105 and held that, even if he could show such a subjective 
                                                          
104 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-43 (citations omitted). 
105 Id. at 743. 
[T]he site of the call is immaterial . . . . Although petitioner’s conduct 
may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation 
private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to 
preserve the privacy of the number he dialed. Regardless of his 
location, petitioner had to convey that number to the telephone 
company . . . if he wished to complete his call. The fact that he dialed 
the number on his home phone rather than on some other phone could 
make no conceivable difference, nor could any subscriber rationally 
think that it would. 
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expectation, it is not one society would regard as reasonable: 
“[E]ven if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that 
the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this 
expectation is not ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’” The Court went on to state that it has consistently 
held “that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”106 
Smith, therefore, suffers from the same weakness as Miller. It 
applies an assumption of the risk rationale to a situation in which 
the Consumer actually has no choice but to forego privacy 
expectations unless he is willing to forego a material, if not 
practically essential, service.107 
The Supreme Court has applied the Miller-Smith principle in a 
variety of cases.108 It summarized the rationale for the principle in 
United States v. Jacobsen: 
[W]hen an individual reveals private information to 
another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal 
that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of 
that information. Once frustration of the original 
expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth Amendment does 
                                                          
Id. 
106 Id. at 743-44 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)) 
(citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-44). 
107 Smith is also distinguishable on its facts from most of the situations we 
address. The Court based its decision in large part on the fact that subscribers 
had to know from their bills that the phone company kept records of numbers 
dialed. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. The same assumption cannot be made about the 
extent to which Consumers understand or appreciate the nature of data 
collection or mining or the extent to which database technology can compile and 
aggregate information about disparate transactions. 
108 See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-42 (1988) (applying 
Smith’s assumption of risk analysis to hold it was not a search for police to fly 
over individual’s back yard to discover marijuana plants); S.E.C. v. Jerry T. 
O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 735-36, 743 (1984) (holding that Miller foreclosed 
“respondents from arguing that notice of subpoenas issued to third parties is 
necessary to allow a target to prevent an unconstitutional search or seizure of his 
papers”). 
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not prohibit governmental use of the now non-private 
information . . . . The Fourth Amendment is implicated 
only if the authorities use information with respect to which 
the expectation of privacy has not already been 
frustrated.109 
The Jacobsen Court therefore construed privacy as an ephemeral 
concept—as something that vanishes absolutely once access to 
information has been shared with others. In short, the Court has 
applied an assumption of risk analysis that makes informational 
privacy a purely zero-sum (i.e., private or not-private) concept. A 
Consumer who fails to keep information solely to herself loses all 
Fourth Amendment protection. This is, as we explained above, 
applying an eighteenth-century bricks-and-mortar conception of 
privacy to a world that has been, and is being, fundamentally 
altered by rapidly-evolving, pervasive technologies.110 
B. The Inadequacy of Twentieth Century Analysis for Twenty-
First Century Technology 
Miller and Smith evince an unarticulated assumption that the 
Fourth Amendment conception of privacy is zero-sum. If that were 
true, then Consumers have no control over the information they 
(knowingly, unknowingly, willingly or unwillingly) provide to 
others regardless of the extent to which that information is personal 
or private and whether it is required for the purchase of goods or 
services that are necessary or even desirable for meaningful 
participation in twenty-first century society. In other words, as 
computer technology becomes more embedded in society, 
consumers will be increasingly forced to waive their Fourth 
                                                          
109 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (emphasis added). The issue in Jacobsen was 
the propriety of law enforcement agents’ observing evidence that had been 
brought to their attention by private parties. Id. at 111. The Court held, 
essentially, that since the private parties’ observation of the evidence had 
already compromised Jacobsen’s privacy interest in it, the subsequent viewing 
by law enforcement did not constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 118-19. 
110 See supra notes 1-5 & accompanying text. 
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Amendment rights in order to obtain vital goods and services. We 
must consider, therefore, whether the Supreme Court’s approach is 
justified. 
With all due respect to the Court, we submit that its zero-sum 
construct reflects at least five errors. First, it ignores the sound 
two-pronged approach of Katz. Second, it wrongly assumes that 
the mere transmittal of data constitutes a disclosure of information. 
Third, it erroneously concludes that a disclosure to a person who 
has promised to maintain the confidentiality of that information is 
a disclosure to the public.111 Fourth, it would apply the assumption 
of risk construct even when (a) the Consumer enters into a 
transaction by which she does not accept that risk and (b) the 
disclosure is an inherent component of a socially beneficial or 
necessary relationship such that she would have to forego that 
relationship to avoid the disclosure.112 Fifth, holding that the 
consent of a Collector to a Government request for information 
overcomes the Consumer’s privacy interest reflects an 
inappropriate balancing of society’s interest in privacy versus 
Government’s interest in investigation. The sections below outline 
our analysis of each of these issues. 
                                                          
111 The Court did not focus in Miller or Smith on the contractual interests of 
the Consumer or the Collector. The analysis appears to have been more akin to a 
tort concept of assumption of the risk. We note that the fact that a Consumer 
might have a claim for breach of contract against the Collector who discloses 
private Data should not affect the issues addressed here if only because (i) any 
contractual remedy would come too late to protect the Consumer’s privacy 
interest and (ii) it would be extremely difficult to translate the harm to the 
Consumer into monetary damages. 
112 Thus, disclosures to third parties such as Internet Service Providers, 
health insurers and smart home services vendors differ fundamentally from the 
types of disclosures that Warren and Brandeis addressed. The Warren-Brandeis 
article was concerned with disclosures made that were made to other people by 
chance, i.e., by being in a particular place at a particular time. One could argue 
that the element of choice is missing, but there is another difficulty with 
assuming privacy in this context: The complained-of information (photography, 
description of what someone did) was gathered in an ostentatiously public 
place—a street, a restaurant, a hotel, etc. It is, after all, inevitable that certain of 
our actions will occur in public spaces; we cannot insist that our every action is 
private and must be ignored. 
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1. Application of the Katz Two-Part Test Supports Fourth 
Amendment Protection to Collector-Stored Data 
As noted above,113 the Supreme Court in Smith accepted 
Justice Harlan’s formulation of the Katz holding as the standard 
governing Fourth Amendment privacy analysis: “My 
understanding of the rule . . . is that there is a twofold requirement, 
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”114 
                                                          
113 See supra note 111 & accompanying text. 
114 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. The Court in Smith calls Katz the “lodestar” for 
determining the application of the Fourth Amendment and specifically 
recognized the accuracy of the Harlan restatement: 
This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, 
normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the 
individual, by his conduct, has “exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy,”—whether, in the words of the Katz majority, 
the individual has shown that “he seeks to preserve [something] as 
private.” The second question is whether the individual’s subjective 
expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable,’”—whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the 
individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is “justifiable” under the 
circumstances. 
Smith, 442 U.S. at 740-41 (citations and note omitted). Note that Justice 
Blackmun in Smith inserts the term “viewed objectively” in stating the Katz 
holding, whereas Katz used no such term but instead appears to be referring to 
“justifiable” in the sense of consistent with societal interests. Thus, Katz’s 
holding is stated as follows: 
The government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording 
the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably 
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search 
and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. Immediately following, the Court explained its rationale: 
One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that 
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he 
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read 
the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public 
telephone has come to play in private communication. 
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Miller and Smith, however, ignore that formulation in favor of 
a single-pronged assumption of risk test. In so doing, they ignore 
fundamental safeguards intrinsic in the two-part test. The 
“subjective” element has historical roots that predate even the 
Constitution.115 Those roots demonstrate that the only justifiable 
substantive qualification of the subjective element is that it is 
evaluated in light of all facts and circumstances known to the 
Consumer.116 The reason for this should be obvious. Although the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to promote reasonable 
Government action, even reasonable Government action is 
subordinate to society’s interest in honoring generally accepted 
expectations as to what is, and what is not, private. 
Miller and Smith depart from that subjective standard by 
applying an objective test based on what judges think reasonably 
knowledgeable citizens know. Thus, in holding that a bank 
customer assumes the risk of providing information to his bank, 
the Court is really saying that the customer’s expectation that his 
records will remain private is categorically unreasonable. That is 
not a valid assessment of the customer’s subjective assessment of 
risk, however, but an objective evaluation. 
Nor can the Miller-Smith assumption of risk test be justified on 
the basis of the second, objective prong of the Katz formula. The 
Miller-Smith test considers only the empirical question of whether 
the Consumer should have held her subjective belief—that is, 
whether she should have expected potential additional disclosures 
to third parties.117 The second Katz prong, however, makes 
                                                          
Id. This explanation demonstrates that it is not just the precautions the caller 
takes to protect his privacy by closing the door that entitles him to rely on the 
Fourth Amendment, it is also the fact that telephone communication plays a vital 
role in society and therefore is worthy of protection. 
115 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 14, at 8-47 (describing conceptions of 
privacy in American colonies). 
116 See Brenner, supra note 13, at __. 
117 Miller recognized that Katz was the governing case, but it narrowed the 
Fourth Amendment issue to the following: 
But in Katz the Court also stressed that “(w)hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.” We must examine the nature of the particular documents 
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constitutional sense only if it addresses a totally different question: 
On balance, should society protect the privacy of information 
disclosed in such a fashion?118 This prong, in other words, forces 
the courts to decide whether it is in society’s interest to extend the 
zone of privacy even to protect confidential disclosures. The 
Supreme Court somehow lost sight of this issue and turned Katz 
                                                          
sought to be protected in order to determine whether there is a 
legitimate “expectation of privacy” concerning their contents. 
U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (citations omitted). The Court then 
concluded: 
All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and 
deposit slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the 
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of 
business . . . . The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to 
another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the 
Government. 
Id. at 442-43. Smith adopts a similar approach: 
The second question is whether the individual’s subjective expectation 
of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
“reasonable,” . . . —whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the 
individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is “justifiable” under the 
circumstances. 
Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations omitted). 
The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the 
modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally 
completed calls for the subscriber. Petitioner concedes that if he had 
placed his calls through an operator, he could claim no legitimate 
expectation of privacy. We are not inclined to hold that a different 
constitutional result is required because the telephone company has 
decided to automate. 
Id. at 744-45 (citation omitted). 
118 This is the only reasonable reading of the above quoted statement that a 
caller who takes the precaution to call from a phone booth with the door closed 
is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See supra note 91, at 22 
& accompanying text. But see Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (converting the inquiry 
simply to an objective inquiry into risk assumption: “The second question is 
whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is “one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable,’” . . . —whether, in the words of the Katz 
majority, the individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is ‘justifiable’ under 
the circumstances”). 
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into a test that eliminated the issue of societal interest, the only 
appropriate constitutional concern. The result is a mere tort-like 
foreseeability test: Information is private only if the Consumer 
could not foresee its disclosure by a Collector. 
The difference between Katz and Katz-as-interpreted-by-
Miller-Smith, is far from merely semantic. Katz does not direct 
courts to analyze whether a disclosure was foreseeable, as Miller-
Smith suggest, but to determine whether information falls within a 
definition of “private.” Whereas Miller-Smith ipso facto deny 
Fourth Amendment protection simply because the Consumer could 
foresee the risk of disclosure, Katz requires the court to evaluate 
the facts to determine whether the information remains private 
under the Fourth Amendment despite disclosure. Under Katz, the 
court should consider (1) whether the Consumer has bargained for 
a promise not to disclose the information to the public or 
Government, (2) whether the Collector ever actually sees the 
information, (3) the nature of the information, and (4) the societal 
benefits of the Consumer’s disclosures to the Collector. Under 
Miller-Smith those facts are irrelevant, but under Katz¸ they are 
relevant to both of the prongs.119 The first three of the four facts 
are relevant to the first prong because each is relevant to an 
expectation whether the Collector would disclose the Data: A 
reasonable Consumer could have a subjective expectation of 
privacy because a Collector is certainly less likely to disclose Data 
that (1) it has promised to keep confidential, (2) it never sees, and 
(3) the Collector would appreciate is private because of the nature 
of the information (e.g., health Data). All four facts fit more 
appropriately into the second prong because (1) society has an 
interest in enforcing bargains, (2) a mere transfer of Data is not a 
disclosure that justifies Government access, (3) information that is 
inherently personal is more worthy of societal protection, and (4) 
society has an interest in fostering technology and increasing 
economic efficiency. 
                                                          
119 The Katz test might be less subject to misapplication if its two prongs 
were labeled “individual” and “societal” rather than “subjective” and 
“objective.” 
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2. A Compilation of Digital Data Is Not the Equivalent To A 
“Disclosure” of Information 
Miller and Smith also erred in devising notions of disclosure 
based on a comparison of personal communication to the transfer 
of data. The reasoning in both Smith and Miller relied on cases 
such as United States v. Hoffa120 that dealt with verbal disclosures 
by one individual to other persons.121 In Hoffa, the Court held that, 
although the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from 
unwarranted government intrusions into their homes, offices and 
hotel rooms,122 it does not protect them from their misplaced belief 
that those in whom they confide will not share their confidences 
with the authorities. 123 
There is, however, a constitutionally significant factual 
distinction between Hoffa and Government access to stored digital 
transaction data. In the former situation, the individual who 
communicates with another person (i) knows what he has said, (ii) 
knows that the recipient is not only able, but likely, to evaluate the 
implications of the information transmitted, and (iii) knows that the 
recipient may decide, based on that evaluation, to disclose the 
information to others. The one who shares information with 
another individual is also likely to appreciate and rely on the limits 
of human memory and the cognitive constraints sociologists call 
“bounded rationality.” The person who shares information also is 
likely, as a matter of empirical reality, to have some idea of what 
other information the recipient can combine with the information 
transmitted.124 
                                                          
120 385 U.S. 293, 301-302 (1966). See also Lopez v. United States, 373 
U.S. 427, 437-40 (1963). 
121 Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 301-02. 
122 Id. at 301. 
123 Id. at 302 (“Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed 
the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief 
that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal 
it.”). 
124 For a discussion of the legal implications of the limits of the human 
mind to absorb and correlate information, see generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, 
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 
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Now, contrast that scenario with the transfer of transactional 
data in even a simple Internet purchase, such as buying a book 
from Amazon.com. Because she does not knowingly interact with 
another human being, the Consumer who buys the book has little 
reason to believe that a human being will ever observe or evaluate 
the transaction data. Moreover, depending on her computer 
expertise, she may fail to appreciate the precise Data that is 
transmitted and is equally unlikely to have any appreciable 
understanding of how the Data can be sliced, diced and mixed with 
other data in the Collector’s database.125 In other words, it is 
simply not reasonable to conclude that a Consumer who is not well 
versed in computer technology would view a transfer of digital 
information as presenting the same risk of a disclosure to 
Governmental authorities as a verbal conversation with a 
confidante. Nor would such Consumer be able to appreciate the 
extent to which the Collector and Government can aggregate the 
data deriving from a discrete transaction with the Collector with 
information totally unrelated to the transaction. It is, therefore, 
simply not “reasonable” to conflate the two scenarios and assume 
that any online transfer of data is a disclosure of the type addressed 
by Hoffa and analogous cases. 
How can we reconcile this conclusion with the holdings in 
Smith and Miller? As to Smith, the facts are certainly more 
analogous to the transactional transfer of data described in the 
preceding paragraph than they are to the “snitch” scenario that 
provided the factual foundation for Hoffa. We might attribute the 
holding in Smith to the fact that it was decided almost three 
decades ago, at a time when members of the Court were 
                                                          
(1995). 
125 For example, a Consumer who acquires smart house technology may do 
so primarily for security reasons. She might not be aware of the extent to which 
real time Data is transmitted and retained by the Collector, nor might she 
comprehend how that Data can be aggregated with information about utility and 
telephone usage to provide a comprehensive picture of the activities within the 
house. It is, of course, the very people who are most unsophisticated about 
computer technology who are most likely to under-appreciate the extent to 
which their use of the technology could eliminate their Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
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presumably unaware of the potential for, and consequences of, 
mining data from transactions mediated by evolving 
technologies.126 But one member of the Smith Court, Justice 
Marshall, saw the majority’s error all too clearly. 
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion 
of choice . . . . [I]n the third-party consensual surveillance 
cases, . . . the defendant presumably had exercised some 
discretion in deciding who should enjoy his confidential 
communications . . . . By contrast here, unless a person is 
prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a 
personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but 
accept the risk of surveillance . . . . It is idle to speak of 
‘assuming’ risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, 
individuals have no realistic alternative.127 
Furthermore, just two years prior to the Smith decision, the 
Privacy Protection Study Commission had issued a report that 
pointed out the dangers of allowing unfettered government access 
to data held by third parties.128 
                                                          
126 The precursor of the Internet existed when Smith was decided, but it had 
not yet permeated popular culture; that process began with the introduction of 
personal computers in the early 1980’s. See, e.g., “ARPANET,” Wikipedia: The 
Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARPANET; Eric S. Raymond, 
A Brief History of Hackerdom (2000), http://www. hackemate. 
com.ar/hacking/eng/ part_00.htm#toc3. 
127 Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 749-50 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
128 See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN 
AN INFORMATION SOCIETY, Chapter 9 (1977), http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/ 
1977privacy/c9.htm: 
Traditionally, the records an individual might keep on his daily 
activities, financial transactions, or net worth were beyond government 
reach unless the government could establish probable cause to believe a 
crime had been committed. If government were merely suspicious and 
wanted to investigate, such records were unavailable. The legal 
standards that protected them evolved in a world where such records 
were almost universally in the actual possession of the individual. 
Reflecting that reality, the law only barred government from seizing 
records in the possession of the individual . . . . [T]hat world no longer 
exists. Third parties . . . now keep a great many records documenting 
various activities of a particular individual. Indeed, these third parties 
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It seems, therefore, that the only explanation for the Smith 
holding is that the Court simply erred, presumably because it failed 
to contemplate the devastating effects that using the Katz 
assumption of risk calculus to assess the constitutionality of data 
disclosure by third-parties would have upon privacy. Inferential 
support for this interpretation of Smith comes from state court 
decisions that have rejected its holding.129 
                                                          
keep records about the individual he would not ordinarily have kept in 
the past. Records for life and health insurance, for example, are 
repositories of highly intimate personal data . . . which were virtually 
unknown until recent decades . . . . 
 The existence of records about an individual that are not in his 
possession poses serious privacy protection problems . . . . Record 
keepers can . . . [and] often do . . . disclose records . . . to government 
without seeking the individual’s approval . . . . A government request 
made informally through a personal visit to the record keeper or by a 
telephone call . . . may leave no trace . . . . Even if the individual is 
given notice and documentation of the disclosure, he has no legal right 
to challenge the propriety of government access to his records, despite 
the possibility that the government agent might have been on a “fishing 
expedition.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
129 See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 956 (N.J. 1982): 
The telephone caller is . . . entitled to assume that the numbers he dials 
in the privacy of his home will be recorded solely for the telephone 
company’s business purposes. From the viewpoint of the customer, all 
the information which he furnishes with respect to a particular call is 
private. The numbers dialed are private. The call is made from a 
person’s home or office, locations entitled to protection under . . . the 
New Jersey Constitution. 
See also People v. Spoerleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141-42 (Colo. 1983). 
A telephone is a necessary component of modern life. It is a personal 
and business necessity indispensable to one’s ability to effectively 
communicate in today’s complex society. When a telephone call is 
made, it is as if two people are having a conversation in the privacy of 
the home or office . . . . 
 The concomitant disclosure to the telephone company, for internal 
business purposes, of the numbers dialed by the telephone subscriber 
does not alter the caller’s expectation of privacy and transpose it into an 
assumed risk of disclosure to the government . . . . 
 We view the disclosure to the telephone company of the number 
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This leaves Miller. How do we explain the Court’s holding? 
We could rely on the theory we advanced above to account for the 
holding in Smith—but Miller, unlike Smith, did not involve any use 
of modern computer technology. In fact, since Miller was decided 
during an era where technology had not yet presented the risks to 
privacy that are prevalent today, its holding may be a direct 
function of the times in which it was decided. The Court held that 
Miller lost any Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy by 
assuming the risk that a bank employee would and could read the 
information on any one of his checks. The Court cited Hoffa for 
the proposition that one assumes the risk that those in whom she 
“confides” will share those confidences with the Government.130 
                                                          
dialed as simply the unavoidable consequence of the subscriber’s use of 
the telephone as a means of communication . . . . Any use the telephone 
company might make of such information for its own internal 
accounting purposes is far different from governmental evidence 
gathering. 
 One’s disclosure of certain facts to the telephone company as a 
necessary concomitant for using an instrument of private 
communication hardly supports the assumption that the company will 
voluntarily convey that information to others. Telephone companies are 
in the business of providing telephone subscribers with the equipment 
necessary for electronic communication in today’s world. The 
government, in contrast, investigates for the purpose of prosecuting 
persons for criminal offenses. The expectation that information 
acquired by the telephone company will not be transferred 
without legal process to the government for use against the telephone 
subscriber appears to us to be an eminently reasonable one. 
Id. Accord State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1166-67 (Idaho 1988). 
130 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Smith Court 
used the same approach and finds that neither the nature of the data disclosed or 
the recipient’s decisions as to what information to retain or how to collect it are 
constitutionally significant: 
The fortuity of whether or not the phone company in fact elects to make 
a quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does not in our 
view, make any constitutional difference. Regardless of the phone 
company’s election, petitioner voluntarily conveyed to it information 
that it had facilities for recording and that it was free to record. In these 
circumstances, petitioner assumed the risk that the information would 
be divulged to police. Under petitioner’s theory, Fourth Amendment 
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Writing in 1976, the Miller Court may have operated on the 
assumption that transacting business with a local bank was 
sufficiently analogous to communicating with a confidante to 
support the application of the Hoffa rationale. That is, members of 
the Court who were a product of a distinctly non-technological era 
may have assumed that when one dealt with a bank, one dealt with 
a person—with a teller or a personal banker. If you accept this 
assumption, then it at least becomes conceivable to apply the Hoffa 
assumption of risk calculus to bank records. 
There are, however, factual problems with this assumption, 
even in a non-technological world. For instance, even if a bank 
employee who was responsible for processing checks in the 1970’s 
had the opportunity to view individual checks, he likely could not 
have remembered the information on any one check from among 
the thousands he processed each day.131 Today, with advances in 
automation and the increased efficiency of check processing 
operations, it is unimaginable that a court reasonably could draw 
                                                          
protection would exist, or not, depending on how the telephone 
company chose to define local-dialing zones, and depending on how it 
chose to bill its customers for local calls. Calls placed across town, or 
dialed directly, would be protected; calls placed across the river, or 
dialed with operator assistance, might not be. We are not inclined to 
make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, especially in 
circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be 
dictated by billing practices of a private corporation. 
 We therefore conclude that petitioner in all probability entertained no 
actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and that, 
even if he did, his expectation was not “legitimate.” 
Smith, 442 U.S. at 745. 
131 In the late 1980s, one of the authors was general counsel of a bank that 
processed checks for over 100 other financial institutions. The clerks who 
processed checks handled such a volume that they essentially performed their 
tasks in a “mindless” fashion. This appears to have been true throughout the 
industry. See David H. Autor et al., Upstairs, Downstairs: How Introducing 
Computer Technology Changed Skills and Pay on Two Floors of Cabot Bank, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston – Regional Review (2002), http://www. 
bos.frb. org/economic/nerr/rr2002/q2/upstairs.htm. Moreover, given the volume 
of checks processed and the number of processors, it is highly unlikely that any 
bank employee even saw a significant percentage of any Consumer’s checks. 
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the Miller inference.132 
There are also conceptual problems with the Miller holding. 
The Miller result is flawed even if we accept, for purposes of 
analysis, the empirical assumption that clerks read and remember 
bank records. Engaging in financial transactions with a bank, even 
when the bank is represented by an individual, is not analogous to 
“confiding” in another human being. The structure of the 
transaction differentiates it from the type of face-to-face interaction 
at issue in Hoffa. Miller’s transfer of information did not create the 
risk of disclosure to Government; it was, rather, the bank’s 
retention, compilation and sorting of that information that 
permitted Government to obtain useful information about Miller. 
To phrase the principle more generally, the Consumer has not 
“disclosed” the information that eventually ends up in 
Government’s hands. It is, instead, the Collector’s compilation and 
sorting of Data that “discloses” usable information to Government. 
3. Disclosure To One Party In A Relationship Is Not Disclosure To 
the  Public 
Even if we assume, arguendo, that a transfer of digital 
information is a “disclosure” in the Katz sense, the Miller-Smith 
approach still conflicts with a historically grounded judicial 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. The Miller-Smith 
opinions implicitly assume that a disclosure to a trusted, reputable 
Collector is the same as indiscriminate disclosure to the public.133 
While that assumption might follow from an analysis premised on 
the mere presence of theoretical risk, it ignores the societal value 
of well-placed trust. That is, society does not benefit from trust 
                                                          
132 Id. From the authors’ description of the actual processes conducted by 
employees, it is clear that employees today have neither the time nor any reason 
to assimilate or aggregate information on individual transactions or across 
transactions. 
133 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (“[I]n Katz the Court . . . stressed that 
‘[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.’”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967)). 
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among thieves (the Hoffa situation), but it does benefit from trust 
among the parties to legitimate personal and commercial 
transactions. A society that encourages or at least respects trust in 
these situations enables the Consumer to enjoy the benefits of new 
technologies without fear that information that would not 
otherwise be “capture-able” will be appropriated by the 
Government. Encouraging and respecting trust also allows 
Collectors to offer those technologies at lower prices because 
Consumers do not have to negotiate additional protections nor do 
Collectors have to provide assurances beyond mere trustworthy 
undertakings. 
Neither the Miller nor the Smith Court explained why any 
disclosure is equivalent to a public disclosure, even though the 
logical inconsistency of this proposition is apparent. Public 
disclosure forfeits Fourth Amendment protection because it 
eliminates any possible claim that Government intrusion has 
affected a Consumer’s privacy interests. There is far less harm in 
letting the Government access information the Consumer has 
shown she has no interest in keeping from anyone. The 
Government should not be put in a position inferior to that of the 
general public; what is available to “the public” should also be 
available to the Government without its having to satisfy the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. So, we cannot raise 
Fourth Amendment objections if the Government obtains 
information we post on a publicly-accessible website, displayed in 
our front yards or discussed in loud voices while on cell phones in 
a crowded airport. In each of these situations we have clearly 
demonstrated our lack of interest in controlling access to the 
information in question. In each of these situations, we have also 
broadcast the information by knowingly or recklessly sending it 
into the public domain. 
The conduct at issue in these and other broadcast scenarios is 
vastly different from the conduct involved in, for example, (i) 
disclosing information to a Collector over a secure Internet 
connection in the course of purchasing sexual dysfunction 
medicines, pornography or religious literature and/or (ii) disclosing 
information as an incident of utilizing the services of an ISP, a 
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telephone company or a company that provides security or other 
monitoring services to one’s home or office.134 The disclosures in 
categories (i) and (ii) are controlled disclosures, in that they 
represent the limited, focused sharing of information with a 
Collector as an integral part of a legitimate transaction between the 
individual and that Collector.135 In that sense, disclosures of this 
type are more analogous to communications encompassed by 
evidentiary privileges than they are to the “broadcast” disclosures 
described in the preceding paragraph.136 
By failing to appreciate the difference between “broadcast” 
disclosures and controlled disclosures, Miller and Smith 
oversimplify the privacy equation in a fashion that erodes Fourth 
Amendment protections. The Court should therefore overrule the 
Miller-Smith “per se public disclosure” rule and implement a 
Fourth Amendment standard that protects a Consumer’s controlled 
disclosure of information to a Collector as a reasonable incident of 
a legitimate transaction for goods or services. Fourth Amendment 
privacy should not be lost when the event that “frustrates” the 
Consumer’s expectation of privacy is Government’s action, 
including its purchase of Data for surveillance or investigatory 
purposes, its use of regulatory leverage, or its ability to induce 
disclosure by a quid pro quo bargain arising out of its investigation 
of the Collector.137 
                                                          
134 The fact that a professional athlete proclaims his use of a sexual 
dysfunction product does not establish that society should decline to regard the 
transaction noted in the text above as worthy of Fourth Amendment protection. 
The same holds for the purchase of non-obscene pornography or religious 
literature, both of which are protected by the First Amendment. 
135 We would not, as noted earlier, bring the Hoffa “snitch” scenario into 
the Fourth Amendment calculus. For one thing, society has no interest in 
protecting trust in such relationships. For another, the communications in 
“snitch” scenarios intrinsically involve unlawful activity, unlike the legitimate 
transactions discussed in the text above. 
136 See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE 
ON EVIDENCE, EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES §1.2.1 (2002) (“Recognition of 
evidentiary privileges . . . promotes personal autonomy in the sense of decisional 
privacy.”). 
137 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“The Fourth 
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4. The Assumption of Risk Doctrine Ignores the Consumer’s 
Bargain With the Collector and Her Lack of Meaningful Choice 
For the Miller-Smith assumption of risk principle to make 
sense, the following conditions would have to exist: (1) the 
Consumer did not secure the Collector’s promise not to disclose 
certain information to Government; and (2) at the time she made 
the disclosure, she had a realistic, practical choice either to (a) 
reveal that information and forego privacy or (b) not disclose the 
information and retain privacy. Regarding the first condition, it 
perverts the English language to say that a Consumer assumed the 
risk of disclosure when she entered into a transaction with a 
Collector who promised to maintain the confidentiality of data she 
provided by the Consumer, either as part of a basic service 
agreement or website terms of use.138 Instead, the Collector has 
                                                          
Amendment is implicated only if the authorities use information with respect to 
which the expectation of privacy has not already been frustrated.”). The 
authorities should not be able to rely on the “frustration” they have caused. A 
more difficult issue might concern the ability of Government to use Data a 
Collector freely discloses albeit in violation of the Collector’s confidentiality 
agreement. One could argue that this is just a variant of the Hoffa snitch scenario 
and the Government should be able to take advantage of the Collector’s 
unilateral decision, thereby leaving the Consumer with her civil remedies 
against the Collector. We believe, however, that Government should not be able 
to use that Data because the privacy interest is “shared” and therefore not the 
Collector’s to disclose unilaterally. 
138 Websites vary in how they address the privacy of information. Google 
for example, has a fairly weak statement of privacy. See Google Privacy Policy 
Highlights, http://www.google.com/privacy.html. Banks, on the other hand, are 
more likely to warrant greater privacy protection, given the more sensitive 
nature of the Data they typically collect. See Bank of America Privacy Policy for 
Consumers, http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/ 
index.cfm?template=privacysecur_cnsmr (“For example, Customer Information 
may be disclosed in connection with a subpoena or similar legal process, fraud 
prevention or investigation, risk management and security, and recording of 
deeds of trust and mortgages in public records.”). Of course, given the current 
state of the law, Collectors may feel free to carve out from their privacy pledge 
government requests for Data. See, e.g., Insure.com Privacy Policy, 
http://www.insure.com/privacy_statement.html. The same argument applies 
when a Consumer transacts business with a website that advertises that it is 
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assumed the risk of maintaining privacy. Allocating the risk to the 
Consumer gives the Government an incentive to see that the 
Collector breaches its agreement with her; this, in turn, would only 
encourage Government to abuse its leverage as a regulator and 
prosecutor, something which some suggest is already occurring.139 
                                                          
certified as maintaining consumer privacy. See, e.g., Insure.com Home Page, 
www.insure.com (promoting that the website is secure by including a logo 
stating that it is a “VeriSign Secured Site”). Certifications would be an efficient 
substitute for detailed contractual provisions. Recognition of Fourth Amendment 
protections for data covered by a confidentiality agreement under the approach 
urged here would create a market for such certification programs. 
139 See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE SURVEILLANCE-
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: HOW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSCRIPTING 
BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SURVEILLANCE 
SOCIETY 10-11 (2004) [hereinafter ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX]. 
To obtain information about individuals’ activities, the government 
often need do no more than ask. Many companies are willing to hand 
over the details of their customers’ purchases or activities based on a 
simple request from the FBI or other authorities. Some companies 
believe they are being patriotic; others may be afraid to turn down 
‘voluntary’ requests because they fear regulatory or law enforcement 
scrutiny of their own activities; others may simply be eager to please. 
 Multiple airlines have admitted turning over the records of their 
customers’ travels to the government. In each case, the information was 
turned over not to help the government solve a particular crime or track 
a particular suspect, but in order to examine each traveler’s records in 
the hopes of identifying terrorists by detecting ‘suspicious’ patterns in 
his or her travels – in effect, turning every traveler into a suspect. 
Id. 
Scuba shops. In May 2002 the Professional Association of Diving 
Instructors voluntarily provided the FBI with a disk containing the 
names, addresses and other personal information of about 2 million 
people, nearly every U.S. citizen who had learned to scuba dive in the 
previous three years. 
Colleges and universities. A 2001 survey found that 195 colleges and 
universities had turned over private information on students to the FBI, 
often in apparent violation of privacy laws; 172 of them did not even 
wait for a subpoena. 
Travel companies. A 2001 survey of travel and transportation 
companies found that 64 percent had provided customer or employee 
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The Miller-Smith assumption of risk principle is based on the 
Court’s holding in Hoffa that individuals accept the risk of 
disclosure of their criminal plans.140 Hoffa is, however, factually 
and conceptually inapposite to the Consumer-Collector 
relationship. For one thing, Hoffa, who made the disclosure, did 
not bargain for confidentiality or have any reason to repose trust. 
Indeed, the opposite is true—a reasonable person would have had 
every reason to distrust the faithfulness of his criminal associate. 
The criminal relationship is distinguishable from the relationship 
between the Consumer and the Collector with whom she transacts 
business in the ordinary course in reliance on the Collector’s 
assurances of confidentiality. In the snitch scenario, the person is 
clearly taking “unreasonable” chances; in the Consumer-Collector 
relationship, the Consumer is simply acting as a rational, law-
abiding person operating in a market economy. Also, we must not 
underestimate the coercive force of a Government “request” to a 
Collector for information about a Consumer.141 Even if the 
Collector is not a directly regulated entity such as a bank or 
insurance company, legitimate businesses will feel pressure to 
cooperate with law enforcement requests for information for a 
variety of reasons,142 not the least of which is the Collector’s need 
for cooperation from law enforcement in the event that it becomes 
a victim of cybercrime. 
The lack of meaningful choice also distinguishes the 
Consumer-Collector relationship from the snitch scenario that 
produced the holding in Hoffa.143 Nothing in the history of the 
Fourth Amendment suggests that citizens should have to choose 
between their constitutional rights and access to the most efficient 
means of participating in commercial and personal affairs.144 Yet 
                                                          
data to the government, many of them in violation of their own privacy 
policies. 
Id. at 11 (notes omitted). 
140 See infra Part II.B.2. 
141 See ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 139. 
142 Id. 
143 See infra Part II.B.2. 
144 Indeed, a concern for protecting business and commercial premises was 
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the ever-increasing pervasiveness of technology, the growth of 
electronic commerce and the developments in database technology 
mean that citizens accessing such basic services as 
communications and banking jeopardize their Fourth Amendment 
protections just by acting as rational Consumers. 
The Court essentially conceded as much in Smith, when it 
recognized that Government could not destroy subjective 
expectations of privacy by televising notices that citizens were 
subject to warrantless search.145 Miller and Smith effectively 
constitute such a notice: use a bank or a phone and you lose your 
Fourth Amendment privacy. In a society marked by ubiquitous 
technology, the choice to share or not share Data is meaningful 
only to the Consumer who is willing to forego participation in that 
society. Miller and Smith simply reached the wrong conclusion. At 
the beginning of the twenty-first century it has become apparent 
that it is not prudent to hold Consumers to a Hobson’s choice 
between enjoying the benefits of modern technology and foregoing 
their privacy, or becoming Luddites and retaining a level of 
                                                          
one of the factors that prompted adopting of the Fourth Amendment. See 
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1978). 
145 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979). 
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz’s two-pronged 
inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment 
protection. For example, if Government were suddenly to announce on 
nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to 
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any 
actual expectation or privacy regarding their homes, papers, and 
effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country . . . 
erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his 
telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding 
the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such 
circumstances, where an individual’s subjective expectations had been 
‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth 
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could 
play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protection was. In determining whether a ‘legitimate 
expectation of privacy’ existed in such cases, a normative inquiry 
would be proper. 
Id. What we propose in this article is just such a “normative inquiry.” 
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privacy. 
5. The Doctrine Encourages Economic Inefficiencies by Ignoring 
Societal Interests in Privacy and In the Promotion of 
Technological Advances 
Through their legislatures, Americans have expressed an 
abiding interest in maintaining the privacy of stored transactional 
data. Recent statutes such as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act146 and 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996147 
include extensive privacy protection provisions. This concern over 
privacy of stored data is also demonstrated by the massive grass 
roots objections to a “know your customer” regulation proposed by 
the federal banking agencies in 1999. More specifically, this 
legislation has generated tens of thousands of written objections 
from the public.148 Thus, it is clear that the American public 
perceives as reasonable an expectation that Collectors will 
maintain the confidentiality of their stored data. Clearly, 
Americans do not assume that permitting Collectors to maintain 
extensive databases of information gives the Collector the right or 
power to disclose that information as the Collector wishes. 
Therefore, denying Fourth Amendment protection simply because 
the Collector bows to Government pressure149 to release the 
information can only jeopardize the confidence of Consumers in 
the Collectors’ undertakings that involve confidentiality. 
Jeopardizing that confidence is bad policy for two reasons. 
First, it will cause Consumers to be less likely to share 
information, which will result in less reliable information being 
                                                          
146 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2005) (protecting 
privacy of non-public personal information provided by consumers to financial 
institutions, especially with respect to disclosure to other commercial entities). 
147 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.512(e) (2005) (protecting privacy of non-public personal health 
information held by doctors, hospitals, insurers, benefit plans and others). 
148 See Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 Fed. Reg. 15310 
(Mar. 31, 1999). 
149 See ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, supra note 139. 
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provided to Collectors and therefore, less efficient service by 
vendors. Because this chilling effect is likely to be random, 
depending as it does on the sensitivity of particular Consumers to 
privacy issues and the nature of the goods or services provided by 
the Collector, Collectors will be unable to make accurate 
adjustments to their Data, and there is likely to be a net loss in 
Consumer economic welfare. 
Moreover, application of the current Miller-Smith assumption 
of risk doctrine to Government requests to Collectors for 
information will tend to discourage technological advance. First, 
Collectors’ compliance costs will increase on the reasonable 
assumption that Government requests for information will be 
broader and more frequent than they would be if Government had 
to obtain a warrant. Second, some Consumers will forgo the use of 
technology that involves data retention because they value their 
privacy more than any time or costs savings associated with the 
technology. We suggest that there is little policy basis for the Court 
to adopt a rule that makes Fourth Amendment protection depend 
on the economic considerations involved in a Consumer’s choice 
to buy pornography at a brick and mortar store instead of over the 
Internet, especially when we consider the cost savings generally 
inherent in electronic commerce. 
In sum, the Miller-Smith approach represents flawed 
constitutional analysis, unsound economic policy, and harmful 
social engineering. The Court’s formalistic view of privacy, which 
turns on an un-empirical, non-conceptual notion of assumption of 
risk, rewards Government for lazy investigation while chilling 
citizens’ willingness to take advantage of the efficiencies and 
conveniences of new technologies. A non-zero-sum approach to 
privacy that derives from relationships created to take advantage of 
new technologies and that is analogous to old-century notions of 
privacy would be more consistent with Consumer expectations 
while minimally interfering with Government’s ability to conduct 
appropriate investigations. 
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III. RELATION-BASED SHARED PRIVACY 
The reasoning set forth in Section II leads us to the conclusion 
that Fourth Amendment protection should not depend on a legally-
formalistic assumption of risk model. Instead, we believe that it is 
more consonant with the purposes and history of the Fourth 
Amendment for constitutional protection to turn on the nature of 
the relationship between Consumers and Collectors. The question 
should be whether the parties have entered into a relationship that 
demonstrates an intent to share the Data, thus giving each party an 
independent constitutional interest in keeping that Data private. 
Stated differently, we contend that Fourth Amendment protection 
for Data should depend on whether the general purposes that lead 
(1) Collectors to store and mine it and (2) Consumers to permit that 
storage and manipulation, reflect the parties’ legitimate expectation 
that the Collector will not exercise sole dominion over the Data. 
Whether this shared-privacy interest exists is determined from the 
nature of the transactions involved and the expressions of the 
parties regarding their relationships. 
This model derives not from the language of the Fourth 
Amendment, for Fourth Amendment analysis is derivative in the 
sense that the Amendment protects, but does not create, privacy 
interests. Nor do we draw our analysis from legal principles, 
although it does bear similarities to traditional property analysis 
(e.g., the notion that different parties can share ownership interests 
in the same thing), and traditional contract analysis (e.g., that 
parties’ reliance interests are worthy of legal protection because 
honoring reliance encourages commerce and discourages unjust 
enrichment). 
We call the approach we derive from this analysis “relation-
based shared privacy.” In this section, we define the types of 
relationships and the nature of the privacy expectations that should 
produce a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy for stored 
transactional data maintained by a Collector. Next, we identify 
four parameters for determining whether Data should be subject to 
Fourth Amendment protection. Each parameter derives from the 
underlying competing interests balanced by the Fourth 
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Amendment: the Consumer’s privacy interest in the information 
and Government’s need for it. 
We start with the premise that one can share information 
without contemplating that the information will be disclosed to the 
public or even to other third persons. We do not suggest, however, 
that Government should have to inquire on a case-by-case basis 
into either the subjective or objective intent of parties who disclose 
information. Rather, Fourth Amendment protection can be based 
solely on the existence of defined relationships from which we can 
conclude that society does or should recognize a privacy interest. 
For example, if we look to old-century analogs, we see that society 
has long recognized that many of these disclosures take place in 
the course of defined relationships, such as wife/husband, 
patient/doctor, client/attorney, and penitent/priest, where society’s 
interest in maintaining the free flow of information justifies even 
an evidentiary privilege. We also can identify other relationships 
that have enough societal significance, if only from the viewpoint 
of personal autonomy and economic efficiency, to justify 
protecting the disclosing party’s interest in the confidentiality of 
the information even if society does not recognize that the 
information should be privileged from disclosure in court 
proceedings. Trade secret protection and enforcement of 
confidentially (non-disclosure) agreements are just two examples 
of doctrines that recognize “shared privacy” interests.150 
In other words, the existence of a relationship of a given nature 
can demonstrate that the disclosing party expected that the 
information disclosed would be kept confidential and that her 
expectation was reasonable. Absent the relationship, the 
information would not be private. For example, a conversation 
                                                          
150 Of course, the notion of shared privacy does not depend on the existence 
of express confidentiality agreements. For example, when servants in the home 
were more common, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the presence of a 
servant destroyed the privacy of a conversation between family members. The 
servants understood that a condition of their employment was that the 
conversations stayed in the room. It would make no sense from a societal 
viewpoint to hold that a conversation was not private just because family 
members failed to dismiss the servant from the room before conversing. 
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between a husband and wife in front of a butler serving dinner in 
the family dining room would remain private, while the same 
conversation in the presence of a waiter in a restaurant would not, 
in the absence of other circumstances, be private.151 
We conclude that the Fourth Amendment should apply to Data 
maintained by a Collector with respect to a Consumer under the 
following conditions: 
(a) the Consumer has provided, and the Collector has 
collected and retained, the Data in the course of a 
relationship that permits a reasonable inference that the 
Data would not be practicably available but for the Data 
collection and mining capabilities of “pervasive 
technology;” 
(b) the Collector maintains the Data (i) at least in part for 
the direct benefit of the Consumer and (ii) the Consumer 
has direct access to at least a material part of the Data; 
(c) the Collector has agreed not to disclose the Data to third 
parties without the Consumer’s consent; and 
(d) Government fails to demonstrate that it could have 
obtained the Data, independent of a request to the 
Collector, in the course of employing its own reasonable 
and ordinary techniques undertaken in connection with the 
                                                          
151 We see two key differences in the two situations. First, the first 
conversation takes place in the home, where there is a greater expectation of 
privacy. However, this spatial consideration does not apply to the present 
context. The more important difference for present purposes is that the spouses 
have an existing relationship with the butler based at least in part on the trust 
that the butler will respect the confidentiality of family conversations. In other 
words, the nature of the trust is that neither the spouses nor the butler feels that 
the butler is free to disclose the conversation outside the home. This conclusion 
is based on the historic understanding that the privacy of the home encompassed 
family members, servants and guests. See, e.g., Oysted v. Shed, 13 Mass 520, 
522-23 (1816). 
 No such trust relationship exists with the waiter at least in the absence of 
other circumstances. The situation might, we repeat might, be different if, for 
example, the spouses are regular customers of the restaurant and the waiter is 
their usual waiter who is familiar with their habits. 
BRENNER MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006 12:35 PM 
 PRIVACY RIGHTS IN TRANSACTIONAL DATA 269 
 
investigation of a specific crime. 
A. Relation-based 
Ubiquitous technology requires a re-evaluation of the 
appropriate balancing of private and public interests for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. Government should have access to Data 
that the Consumer has set adrift in the stream of commerce in the 
sense that the same information would have been disclosed to 
casual observers or employees of the Collector in comparable real-
world transactions. On the other hand, the mere fact that a 
Collector possesses Data should not enable Government to obtain 
it. The problem lies in attempting to identify the factors that should 
be taken into account in determining the appropriate balance in 
cases between these two extremes. 
One way to determine the application of the Fourth 
Amendment in the world of pervasive technology is to compare 
such technological transactions with analogous real-world 
transactions. For example, one factor to consider is the “visibility” 
or “publicity” of the transaction that created the Data at issue. The 
Consumer who buys an automobile tire at a retail store has no 
expectation that the fact of her purchase is private because the 
seller’s employees and other customers can see the purchase; also, 
anyone seeing her car can infer that she had purchased that brand 
of tire.152 The fact of the purchase, therefore, is not private in any 
sense. Thus, the tire purchaser cannot complain if Government 
obtains Data from the retail store, or from manufacturer, 
confirming the fact that she bought that tire or from obtaining 
related transactional Data such as the time, date and price of the 
purchase. 
The same rule should hold true of Data identifying a single 
transaction in the pervasive technology world if sufficient indicia 
identifying that transaction are inherently public. For example, 
Data regarding a tire purchase does not become private just 
                                                          
152 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-83 (1983) (holding 
that it is not considered a “search” to use a beeper to track someone’s 
movements in public spaces). 
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because the purchaser completes the transaction in the privacy of 
her home through cheaptire.com and puts the tire on her car in her 
own garage with the garage door closed. Even though she may 
hide from public view many of the aspects of the transaction, the 
telltale sign is still visible to the public as soon as she takes the car 
onto the public streets, so Government should have access to the 
Data for the same reason as stated above for a retail store 
transaction, assuming, of course, that it can identify the seller.153 
Different concerns are present, however, when a Consumer and 
a Collector each manifest an intention to maintain the privacy of 
transactions that otherwise might be public. For example, a 
Consumer who desires to purchase prescription medicine and 
wishes to maintain her privacy might be entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protection if she purchases the medicine through a 
secure website that promises confidentiality and that delivers the 
medicine in a plain wrapper. The Consumer in this instance is in a 
sense taking the Katz precaution of calling from a closed phone 
booth instead of a pay phone on a restaurant wall, and her decision 
to maintain her privacy should be honored for the same reason. 
The intention to maintain privacy is readily inferable when a 
Consumer, in the course of creating or continuing a relationship 
that anticipates at least the strong likelihood of multiple 
transactions, provides “personal profile” Data that the Collector 
combines in a database with transactional Data. Such a relationship 
can be found in the delivery of “profile Data” to the Collector with 
an expectation on the part of the Consumer and the Collector that 
the Collector will combine profile Data with transactional Data.154 
This combination of personal information with the details of 
multiple transactions creates a corpus of information that 
                                                          
153 Thus, although an on-line purchase may not make the Data per se 
private, it might have the same effect by making it impracticable for 
Government to locate the Collector. 
154 We use “profile Data” to refer to “tool Data” and “Biographical Data” 
as those terms are defined in supra note 40. We emphasize that while each item 
of profile Data may be public in some sense (e.g., Social Security number, 
weight, birth date, mother’s maiden name) they it can be private when 
aggregated. 
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bystanders could not observe and thus supports a conclusion that 
the Consumer and Collector have entered into a private 
relationship.155 Moreover, the Consumer’s willingness to allow the 
Collector to combine personal and transactional Data into a 
database allows us to infer that the Consumer reposes enough trust 
in the Collector’s goods or services that she anticipates repeated 
dealings with the Collector.156 The combination of a corpus of 
complex information and the prospect of repeated dealings is 
sufficient to create and sustain a Fourth Amendment expectation of 
privacy; it also creates the possibility that an aggregation of Data 
can compromise Consumer privacy.157 
                                                          
155 For example, it would not be reasonable to expect that any observer of 
my purchase at Wal-Mart on a given date could keep track of everything I 
purchased and associate that with my name and credit card number, much less 
combine that Data with other Data available to Wal-Mart in its database such as 
details of my other purchases over the years, warranty claims, and information 
derivable from credit-reporting agencies obtainable with my credit card data 
such as address. In other words, by shopping at Wal-Mart I have allowed a 
collection of Data to exist that would be incredibly expensive, if not impossible, 
to obtain through traditional eyewitness observation. 
156 The trust we refer to is not trust that the Collector will not disclose 
information. Rather, it is the Consumer’s trust in the value of the Collector’s 
products such that the Consumer anticipates continued dealing with the 
Collector. It is this trust that makes the Consumer’s disclosure of Data to the 
Collector reasonable under the second prong of the Katz test. See supra note 103 
& accompanying text. 
157 Note that the Consumer may have an expectation of privacy even if such 
Data pertained to a transaction occurring outside the context of pervasive 
technology. For example, mail order and phone order transactions are not 
observable by third parties any more than Internet transactions, and the records 
maintained by the Collector may not differ between the two types of 
transactions. To the extent that database technology is employed in such “old-
world” transactions, our argument, as set forth below, may apply to those 
transactions as well because Consumers should be encouraged to participate 
fully in modern society without requiring a forfeiture of constitutional 
protections. We also note that drawing distinctions in any of these types of 
transactions based on comparisons of database contents to the potential 
recollections of Collector employees is not persuasive, especially when 
transactions are completed solely on the basis of digital transmissions and 
computer generated documents and records. For example, given computer 
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Why should the existence of a relationship with no legal 
substance or grounding have Fourth Amendment significance? The 
answer to that question requires us to revisit the notions of privacy 
discussed previously in Section I. Pervasive technology changes 
the focus of privacy from a Consumer’s right of physical control 
over space or tangible property into a right to impose economic 
sanctions for disclosure of information in databases over which the 
Consumer has no physical control or access. While the notion of 
physical control is a reasonable approach to implementing Fourth 
Amendment privacy when we deal with spaces and things, it is 
meaningless with respect to a modern information-based economy. 
The very nature of an information-based economy depends on the 
transfers of information, and to that extent the maintenance of 
exclusive control renders information valueless. As a result, 
commercial parties virtually always require a transferee of 
“proprietary” (i.e. non-public) Data to execute a “non-disclosure 
agreement.”158 If commercial parties with substantial resources at 
stake cannot insist on physical control over Data, it is difficult to 
imagine how any good faith application of the second Katz prong 
requires such control. That is, the practice demonstrates that 
society is prepared to respect privacy claims as to information even 
when the claimant has failed to retain physical control or access. 
Requiring physical control, therefore, would effectively place Data 
beyond the Fourth Amendment without any balancing of societal 
costs. In short, neither control nor rights of physical access can 
provide a limiting principle that will distinguish Fourth 
Amendment-protected interests in Data. Instead, we need a 
surrogate that will enable us to avoid both the total abrogation of 
the Fourth Amendment to Data in a world of pervasive technology 
and an unprincipled ad hoc application that turns on mere 
                                                          
technology, no employee even completes an address label. This distinction is no 
less meaningful because it was not credited in Miller, where the Court found a 
disclosure even though there was no showing (and little likelihood) that any 
bank employee had or realistically could have had any knowledge of the 
information contained in the bank’s records. 
158 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Images and Contract Law—What Law 
Applies to Transactions in Information, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
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formalistic notions of privacy. 
Focusing on the existence of a “trust” relation between the 
Consumer and the Collector, even though the trust may be merely 
inferential and minimal, enables us to evaluate the reasonableness 
of a Consumer’s claim that Data remains private. This is true even 
though the Data is being maintained by a Collector in a format 
easily accessible upon Government request. Prior to the 
implementation of pervasive data collection, retention and 
aggregation technology, there was not a realistic possibility that a 
Collector could disclose Data reflecting a Consumer’s personal 
profile information and the details of numerous specific 
transactions between the Consumer and the Collector. We can 
therefore confidently say that Consumers in most circumstances 
had a reasonable, empirically-based expectation that the aggregate 
Data reflecting those transactions was not available to 
Government. When the Consumer “trusts” the Collector and its 
products enough to anticipate the potential for such aggregation of 
information, it is unreasonable to conclude that the Consumer in 
providing Data is indifferent to its use. In a very real sense the trust 
in the Collector’s products reflects trust in the integrity of the 
Collector to maintain the privacy of the Data provided.159 
Unless we are ready to adopt the view that Fourth Amendment 
protection should continually narrow as technology increasingly 
permits information to be stored and correlated, there is little 
reason to conclude that a Consumer should expect that Data 
becomes public just because it is mined and aggregated. That is, 
Data inaccessible in the real-world should not lose Fourth 
Amendment protection just because it can be accessed in the 
pervasive world. Even if the Data can be readily provided to 
Government upon request, Katz nevertheless counsels that, as a 
matter of societal values, a Consumer can still reasonably expect 
that it will not be so disclosed simply because she has chosen to 
conduct her affairs by using more efficient pervasive technology to 
conduct transactions with “trusted” parties. 
                                                          
159 See supra notes 138-39 & accompanying text for examples 
demonstrating the prevalence of such Consumer attitudes. 
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B. Shared Interest Based on Direct Consumer Benefit and 
Access 
Not all Data possessed by a Collector in the course of a “trust” 
relation will be entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. There is 
still a role for assumption of risk. A Consumer should be held to 
have assumed the risk that Data collected at the sole instigation 
and for the sole benefit of the Collector is beyond Fourth 
Amendment protection because the Consumer effectively set the 
Data adrift in the stream of commerce. For example, before the 
advent of Data mining, businesses collected Data for internal 
marketing, inventory control, product quality, regulatory and 
warranty liability purposes. The Collector’s use of that Data 
indirectly benefited Consumers in general, whether by lower prices 
or higher quality. Usually, however, the Data itself was not 
manipulated and re-disclosed to assist the Consumer in making 
additional purchase decisions or obtaining services.160 Stated 
differently, individual Consumers received no direct benefit from 
the collection of the Data. Therefore, one could not reasonably 
conclude that the Consumer had provided the underlying 
information with the expectation that the Collector would use the 
Data for the Consumer’s own purposes and benefit. In short, the 
Consumer had given up any “interest” in the information. 
In contrast, Consumers who provide “profile” Data to 
Collectors generally do so because that profile information, when 
combined with transactional Data, saves the Consumer time and/or 
money. A significant amount of those savings can derive from the 
ability of database technology to aggregate or isolate Data to 
provide the Consumer with new information or insights regarding 
her dealings with the Collector. Amazon and eBay are perhaps the 
most famous examples of merchants facilitating customers 
purchasing by keeping track of past purchases and items of 
interest, and by offering suggestions based on profiling 
information. This practice is now so widespread that the websites 
of our banks, our electric utility companies, our insurerers and 
                                                          
160 To the extent the information was so used by salespeople, for example, 
our notion of shared privacy might apply. 
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others readily present me with personalized information that 
greatly reduces my need to keep my own records or to conduct 
extensive investigations of suitable products. In this context, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the Consumer has a shared 
interest in the Data because Consumers are induced to provide the 
relevant information at least in part on the ground that it will 
benefit them as much as the Collector. Because the Consumer 
retains an interest in the Data, the Collector should not have a 
unilateral right to consent to disclosure to Government. Moreover, 
it is reasonable for society to protect that Data from Government 
access because disclosure would discourage Consumers from 
sharing Data that allows them to make more intelligent and more 
efficient transactional decisions. As Katz demonstrates, Consumers 
who take reasonable steps to protect or enhance their privacy do 
not lose their Fourth Amendment rights just because a party with 
whom that information is shared decides to disclose it to 
Government. 
This shared interest is particularly evident when the Collector 
enters Consumer-provided Data into a database that allows the 
Consumer direct access to information about the Consumer’s 
dealings with the Collector. The right and value of direct access to 
information regarding past transactions and related financial 
information is one of the great benefits of Internet-accessible Data 
mining. For example, by going to “My Account” on a electricity 
utility’s website, a Consumer can review her past electricity usage, 
compare it to average usage statistics, estimate potential energy 
saving from replacing her water heater, and evaluate the effect of 
various pricing options in light of her particular energy usage 
patterns. Such access permits a Consumer to use the Data for her 
own purposes unrelated to any benefit to the Collector. For 
example, a Consumer might consult information on orbitz.com 
regarding past flights and hotel stays in connection with 
purchasing travel services on expedia.com or directly from an 
airline. Therefore, the independent usage strengthens the notion of 
a shared interest by both the Collector and the Consumer. 
Direct access also reinforces the significance of the “relation” 
element because it demonstrates the existence of a more permanent 
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relationship between the Collector and the Consumer. The 
Collector incurs the expense of creating and maintaining the 
database to increase the likelihood that the Consumer will enter 
into additional transactions with the Collector. It is this repetition 
that creates the aggregation of Data that increases the risk of an 
invasion of privacy and invalidates an analogy to observation of 
real-world transactions. In short, direct access is a significant 
limiting characteristic of relation-based shared privacy because it is 
strong, investment-backed evidence that the Collector and the 
Consumer are parties not just to a transaction, but to a private 
relationship. 
C. Confidentiality Representation or Agreement 
Parties in the world of pervasive technology rely on contractual 
promises to control access to Data. A Consumer should be required 
to demonstrate that such a promise existed if she desires Fourth 
Amendment protection for her Data. Otherwise, her privacy claim 
is simply not reasonable or credible. Those who do not value 
privacy enough to satisfy this simple element cannot complain 
when the Collector complies with a Government request for Data. 
We do not mean to suggest that Consumers must draft their own 
confidentiality agreements or even have read, much less fully 
appreciate, a Collector’s “website terms of use” regarding privacy 
and Data usage.161 Instead, it is likely that market forces will be 
sufficient to attract privacy-conscious/valuing Consumers to 
Collectors who unilaterally represent that they will not disclose 
Consumer-related Data to Government or third parties without the 
Consumer’s consent. Thus, a Consumer satisfies this element of 
                                                          
161 One might argue that the Consumer should have to demonstrate 
knowledge of the privacy undertaking as a condition to satisfying the first 
(subjective) prong of the Katz test. We believe, however, that placing that 
burden on the Consumer would (i) ignore rational Consumer behavior in relying 
on the branding efforts of leading merchants and on referrals from friends and 
others and (ii) impose unnecessary transaction costs (reading such terms) for 
little societal benefit. In other words, ignorance based on trust should be bliss, 
until Government shows that the trust was misplaced. 
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relation-based shared privacy by demonstrating that the Collector 
included such a confidentiality undertaking in its customer 
agreement or website terms of use. It should also be sufficient to 
show that a third party credentialing service has certified that the 
Collector’s privacy procedures include a commitment not to 
disclose Data to Government without a warrant or grand jury 
subpoena. 
D. Government Need 
The final element of the principle of relation-based shared 
privacy might be understood better as an exception to the general 
rule established by Subparts A through C. The rule should not 
apply when its application would only make Government incur 
unnecessary costs or delays in getting information it could 
practicably obtain for similar real-world transactions. Therefore, 
even if a Consumer establishes the first three elements of the 
principle, Government still should be able to obtain the Data by 
convincing the Collector to comply with a request if the 
Government can show it would have uncovered the information 
contained in the Data by using in good faith its own reasonable and 
ordinary techniques in the course of a criminal investigation. 
For example, a hackneyed Hollywood police investigatory 
technique involves checking with dry cleaners to determine the 
possible owner of clothing found at the crime scene. There is no 
suggestion that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the cleaner from 
checking its records to identify the laundry mark on a shirt. We do 
not suggest that a different result should obtain simply because the 
Collector complies with such a crime-originated request by 
referring to bar coded laundry marks and Consumer accessible 
Data on laundry preferences and usage. However, the burden is on 
Government to demonstrate that it could have obtained the relevant 
information even without access to the relevant database. 
Government could satisfy that burden, for example, by showing 
that the laundry could have provided the relevant information just 
from Data maintained for its own purposes, even though the Data 
would have been protected under the first three elements of 
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relation-based shared privacy. For example, the laundry could 
disclose information, such as name, address and telephone Data 
obtained to help it contact customers in case of loss or damage to 
articles or a customer’s failure to pick up and pay for articles 
cleaned. What it could not do is associate that Data with other Data 
which it maintained for the Consumer’s benefit, such as historical 
data on cleaning of overcoats. 
This “could have obtained it anyway” notion should not be 
applied too generously, especially in the context of requests for 
large amounts of Data.162 Data mining and sifting enable detailed, 
sophisticated and rapid analysis of data that only a generation ago 
would have taken a team of investigators months to analyze. 
Therefore, the exception should not apply simply because the Data 
requested could have been derived from records, such as individual 
invoices or meter readings, the Collector “always” maintained. 
Rather, the exception should apply only if it is reasonable to 
conclude that (i) a Collector would have complied with a request 
for the Data in that format and (ii) Government (or the Collector) 
would have been able to create the Data actually requested within 
the timeframe and budgetary constraints of the investigation at 
issue. 
The requirement of “good faith” should also be emphasized. In 
making requests of Collectors, Government should rely on 
traditional citizen incentives to cooperate with crime 
investigations. Any use of leverage by Government to obtain 
“cooperation” by threats or suggestions of unrelated regulatory 
initiatives or independent investigations of the Collector’s own 
activities does not constitute good faith. Nor should Government 
be able to rely on promises or threats related to cybercrime 
protection for the Collector. A Collector should not be put in the 
position of sacrificing a Consumer’s privacy interests to protect the 
                                                          
162 Government requests to Collectors for Data does not raise Fourth 
Amendment concerns when the Data requested are aggregated and not 
attributable to specific Consumers. Although Collectors are free to ignore such 
requests, Government should be able to make the request and use the Data 
because such Data do not disclose any information that could compromise any 
Consumer’s privacy interest. 
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Collector’s own interests. This likelihood that a Collector will 
succumb to such leverage is especially great where the Consumer 
is unlikely to have the resources to enforce its contractual rights of 
non-disclosure and/or where any enforcement would be futile 
because of difficulties of proving causation or damages. 
Finally, the exception should not swallow the rule—it is 
intended only to assure that cyber-based Data does not receive 
more protection than traditional sources of information. There is a 
great tendency for Government to seek access to Data to determine 
if a crime has been committed or to identify crime risks. Although 
such requests may be finely tuned enough that they cannot fairly 
be called fishing expeditions, there is nothing particularized about 
them and the comparison to the “general warrant” procedure can 
be readily drawn. The exception under discussion cannot be used 
to justify such surveillance-based searches. Once Government 
shows, however, that its request for Data was made in good faith in 
the course of the investigation of a specific crime, it should not be 
precluded from using that Data in prosecution of that crime or 
other crimes as long as the conditions of the exception are met. 
CONCLUSION 
History demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment has always 
been construed to require a balance between two societal interests: 
Government’s need to enforce the law and the citizen’s need to be 
left alone. The appropriate balance may change as our culture 
changes and as our views of the relative importance of law 
enforcement and privacy change. Mere changes in technology, 
however, should not affect that balance unless and until they are 
incorporated in our culture. The phenomena of pervasive computer 
technology and data mining and sifting will eventually change our 
society in fundamental ways, but they are too recent to affect the 
Fourth Amendment balance. In the meantime, constitutional law 
should encourage Americans to enjoy the benefits of technological 
advances without concern that doing so will force them to sacrifice 
their constitutional rights. Thus, courts should apply the Fourth 
Amendment on a technologically neutral basis—new technology 
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should neither per se extend nor retract the scope of 
constitutionally permissible Government intrusions. 
We have argued that the pervasiveness of computer and 
database technology creates significant new risks of Government 
intrusions into the fabric of our daily lives. The low cost of 
information retrieval and increasing Government leverage over 
information Collectors substantially increases the risk that those 
intrusions will occur beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz provided a 
workable standard for protecting Consumers from Government 
attempts to take advantage of pervasive technology, the Court’s 
decisions in Miller and Smith rely too heavily on legalistic 
concepts divorced from societal interests. As a result, a real danger 
exists that aggregations of extremely sensitive personal 
information will be available to Government just for the asking. 
We believe that the traditional balance, as reflected in Katz, can 
be retained only if the Court rejects the formalistic “assumption of 
risk” approach and instead recognizes the privacy interests inherent 
in aggregations of stored transactional data. We have proposed a 
principle of “relation-based shared privacy” which distinguishes 
Data that should be protected because it is in society’s interests to 
facilitate trust-based relationships and efficient sharing of 
information. By focusing on specific attributes of those 
relationships while protecting Government’s ability to investigate 
crimes efficiently, our principle assures that Consumers who take 
advantage of pervasive technologies will not thereby sacrifice their 
right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
